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This thesis examines how the composition of the U.S. fleet, with specific focus on small 
combatants, affects the ability of the United States Navy to undertake homeland defense 
missions and provides suggestions to improve its core competency. 
Currently, the U.S. Navy relies on a shrinking group of aging Oliver Hazard 
Perry class frigates to conduct counter-piracy, counter-narcotics, counter maritime 
insurgency, and maritime engagement missions.  The large warships that make up the rest 
of the fleet are able to undertake these missions, but their cost and capabilities make them 
better suited for other operations. This thesis examines the proposed Littoral Combat 
Ship but argues that it is not the ideal ship: it is too expensive, too vulnerable, and 
undermanned, and it has a modular concept that is too underdeveloped for practical naval 
operations. Instead, this thesis proposes that the U.S. Navy would be better served by 
procuring a traditional frigate or corvette to accomplish the variety of missions that fall 
under the umbrella of homeland defense.  Such a traditional small combatant would 
provide the U.S. Navy with a warship capable of conducting traditional fleet operations 
as well as operating at the lower end of the spectrum of operations. 
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The concept of homeland defense is not new; the Navy has always played a 
crucial role in keeping the threat far from the shores of the United States.  However, the 
changing maritime security environment over the last decade has required that the Navy 
reevaluate its mission priorities.  The modern Navy now plays a substantial role in non-
traditional missions like counter narcotics, counter proliferation, counter piracy, and 
engagement and training with foreign navies.  The role of the Navy has shifted away 
from the traditional Mahanian concept of the blue water fleet and toward the littoral 
regions with actions against smaller navies and non-state actors that pose different threats 
to the United States.  The Navy has not abandoned blue water operations, but now the 
increasing importance of the littorals has forced a change.  As such, the homeland 
defense mission of the Navy has become much more important. 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the composition of the U.S. fleet, with 
specific focus on the small combatants, in order to evaluate fleet composition affects the 
ability of the United States Navy to undertake the various homeland defense missions.  
Additionally, this thesis seeks to provide suggestions to improve this core competency of 
the Navy.  This thesis will address a number of questions concerning the composition of 
the fleet.  The first question that must be answered is: Is the current fleet adequate or 
optimal for the homeland defense mission?  The second question is: If the fleet is not 
adequately or optimally designed to handle the homeland defense mission, what 
capabilities are lacking?  The third question that must be answered is: What would be the 
optimum way of adding these capabilities to the fleet?  
Historically, Navy ships followed along the traditional methods of employment 
and operation and were designed with a specific purpose in mind and a specific role 
within the fleet, ranging from air defense to anti-submarine warfare to shore 
bombardment.  These ships were capable of conducting multiple missions, but 
specialized in doing one mission very well.  But changes in tactics and technology have 
increasingly led to the Navy developing general-purpose ships, such as the Alreigh Burke 
(DDG-51) class, and developing new classes of ships, such as the Littoral Combat Ship 
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(LCS-1 and LCS-2) classes, which are modular and can be reconfigured for a variety of 
missions, depending on what equipment is installed.1 
Currently, the fleet may not be optimally designed to undertake many homeland 
defense and security missions.  Utilizing sophisticated ships that are designed to conduct 
air defense operations around to strike group in conduct counter-piracy, counter-
narcotics, and other missions outside the traditional realm of fleet operations is a waste of 
resources.  A number of the missions that fall under the definition of homeland defense 
occur in the littoral regions where the Navy is unaccustomed and ill equipped to operate.  
The current fleet is still composed of the same types of ships needed to defeat a blue 
water threat during the Cold War. Although almost any Navy ship can handle these non-
traditional missions in some form or another, it is a waste of resources for a ship designed 
around one of the most advanced air-search radar and weapons systems to be conducting 
these missions.  Instead, the Navy may need to construct small, inexpensive types of 
vessels, like corvettes or frigates, which could handle a number of tasks as part of the 
homeland defense mission while still being able to operate with the fleet during times of 
traditional war at sea. 
A. LITERATURE REVIEW 
There is a fair amount of literature available concerning the current and future 
capabilities of the Navy. A number of sources of information come from official 
Department of Defense and Department of the Navy publications and provide the official 
definition of the homeland defense mission.  The most important of these, the Naval 
Operations Concept, is designed to provide a united vision for the three maritime forces 
(U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Coast Guard) at the strategic level.2 Written in 
2010, the Naval Operations Concept provides a unified vision of how the three maritime 
services will work together in order to enhance the security of the United States.3 
                                                
1 U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) 
Program: Background, Issues, and Options for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke, CRS Report RL33741, 
(Washington, DC: Office of Congressional Information and Publishing, December 21, 2012), 1–2. 
2 U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Coast Guard, Naval Operations Concept 2010: Implementing 
the Maritime Strategy (Washington, DC: 2010), 1. 
3 Naval Operations Concept 2010, 1–4. 
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Like the Naval Operations Concept, the 2007 A Cooperative Strategy for 21st 
Century Seapower serves to unite the three maritime services at the strategic and 
operational level.4 Both Joint Publication (JP) 3-27 Homeland Defense and Joint 
Publication (JP) 3-28 Civil Support provide additional strategic information concerning 
the many roles of the Navy in the these missions.5  All four official sources provide 
excellent insight into the official view on the role of the Navy in the homeland defense 
mission. 
In addition to the Department of Defense and Department of Navy publications, 
the largest volume of information comes from a number of Congressional Research 
Service reports (CRS).  The most important of the CRS reports are the Background, 
Issues, and Options for Congress reports concerning the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS).  
The Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program: Background, Issues, and Options for 
Congress report covers a number of pressing issues relating to both the LCS-1 and LCS-2 
classes of ships.  Specifically, the report addresses the numerous problems with 
construction, corrosion, cost overruns, and problems with the mission modules.6 
The final CRS report, the Coast Guard Cutter Procurement: Background and 
Issues for Congress, looks at the entirety of the Coast Guard’s procurement program, and 
the construction of the new National Security Cutter (NSC), Offshore Patrol Cutters, and 
Fast Response Cutters.  The report provides an overview of all three programs, the 
missions of each class of ship, and elaborates on the procurement and construction 
problems that the NSC has faced.7  
                                                
4 U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Coast Guard, A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower 
(Washington, DC: Department of Defense, October 2007), 4–5. 
5 U.S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Homeland Defense Joint Publication (JP) 3-
27, (Washington, DC: CJCS, 12 July 2007); U.S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Civil 
Support Joint Publication (JP) 3-28, (Washington, DC: CJCS, September 14 ,2007). 
6 CRS, Navy Littoral Combat Ship, 1-6; CRS, Navy Littoral Combat Ship, 16; CRS, Navy Littoral 
Combat Ship, 36–37. 
7 U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Coast Guard Cutter Procurement: 
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke, CRS Report RL33753, (Washington, DC: 
Office of Congressional Information and Publishing, July 31, 2012), 2–3. 
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Only one CRS report examines alternate fleet compositions.  In 2007, the CRS 
issued Navy Force Structure: Alternative Force Structure Studies of 2005—Background 
for Congress.  This report summarizes three different reports from 2005 by the Center for 
Naval Analyses (CNA), the Office of Force Transformation (OFT), and the Center for 
Strategic and Budgetary Analysis (CSBA).8 Both the CNA and OFT are Department of 
Defense organizations, while the CSBA is an independent group. Both the CNA and 
CSBA reports describe a fleet very similar to the official Navy shipbuilding plan. The 
OFT report, however, creates three possible fleets, two of those fleets are radically 
different from anything the Navy has ever built.9 
Another source of official information comes from the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO).  Like the CRS reports, the GAO report covers the LCS 
program.  And like the CRS reports, the GAO reports are critical of the programs, yet still 
officially support the continued acquisition of the LCS.  The two GAO reports on the 
LCS program, Actions Needed to Improve Operating Cost Estimates and Mitigating Risk 
in Implementing New Concepts and Navy’s Ability to Overcome Challenges Facing the 
Littoral Combat Ship Will Determine Eventual Capabilities, show that the LCS program 
relies too heavily on unproven technologies and concepts and serious thought needs to be 
done before the ships enter the fleet.10  
The final official source comes from the Congressional Budget Office (CBO).  In 
2009, the CBO published a paper looking at the possible benefits of combining the Navy 
(LCS) and Coast Guard (NSC) small combatant programs.11 The CBO report examines 
three different possibilities on combining the Coast Guard NSC and OPC programs and 
                                                
8 U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Navy Force Structures: Alternative Force 
Structures Studies of 2005—Background for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke, CRS Report RL33955, 
(Washington, DC: Office of Congressional Information and Publishing, April 9, 2007. 
9 CRS, Navy Force Structures, 5. 
10 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Actions Needed to Improve Operating Cost Estimates and 
Mitigating Risks in Implementing New Concepts, GAO-10-257, (Washington, DC: Government Printing 
Office, 2010), 1; U.S Government Accountability Office, Navy’s Ability to Overcome Challenges Facing 
the Littoral Combat Ship Will Determine Eventual Capabilities, GAO-10-523 (Washington, DC: 
Government Printing Office, 2010), 1. 
11 Congressional Budget Office, Options for Combining the Navy’s and the Coast Guard’s Small 
Combatant Programs (Washington, DC: GPO, 2009), 1. 
 5 
Navy LCS programs: 1) base the NSC on a variant of the LCS; 2) reduce the number of 
LCSs purchased by the Navy and have the Navy purchase a version of the NSC; or 
3) cancel the OPC and have the Coast Guard purchase additional NSCs.  The report finds 
that though there are some benefits with merging the two programs, additional work 
would be required to satisfy the requirements of both services.12 
Though the CRS and GAO reports concerning the LCS program are critical of 
certain aspects of the program, they all agree that the Navy has made the correct decision.  
The most critical voices come from outside the Department of Defense (DoD) and the 
Department of the Navy, specifically from naval officers and defense industry officials.  
A number of critical articles have been written for the U.S. Naval Institute magazine 
concerning the LCS program.  In the April 2012 issue of Proceedings magazine, 
Lieutenant Commander Chuck Schlise, USN, wrote an article about the Navy’s need to 
create a class of ships to fit in the gap between the low end LCS and the high end DDG-
51.13 In another Proceedings article, Lieutenant Colonel Paul T. Darling, Alaska Army 
National Guard, and Lieutenant Justin Lawlor, USNR, wrote an article detailing the need 
for a frigate-like vessel with multi-mission capabilities, instead of the LCS.14 In January 
2011, U.S. Navy (Ret.) Commander John Patch wrote an article for Proceedings 
magazine enumerating the problems with the LCS program.15 He criticizes the program 
for its complexity, cost, impractically, inefficiency, vulnerability and risk, and provides a 
number of options for fixing the program or replacing it.16 Milan Vego wrote in the 
September 2009 issue of Proceedings an article discussing a number of flaws in the LCS 
program.  According to Vego, the greatest flaw with the LCS platform is the emphasis on 
speed at the expense of weapons systems and survivability.17 In September 2012, U.S. 
Navy (Ret.) Captain Robert Carney Powers wrote an article that details the history of the 
                                                
12 CBO, Small Combatants, 14–20. 
13 Chuck Schlise, “Shooting for the Middle,” Proceedings, April 2012, accessed February 21, 2013, 
http://www.usni.org/print/23988. 
14 Paul T Darling and Justin Lawlor, “Frigates for Streetfighters,” Proceedings, September 2011, 
accessed February 21, 2013, http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2011-09/frigates-streetfighters. 
15 John Patch, “The Wrong Ship at the Wrong Time,” Proceedings, January 2011, accessed February 
21, 2013, http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2011-01/wrong-ship-wrong-time. 
16 Patch, “Wrong Ship, Wrong Time.” 
17 Milan Vego, “No Need for High Speed,” Proceedings, September 2009, accessed February 21, 
2013 http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2009-09/no-need-high-speed. 
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LCS program and looks at how both versions of the LCS have diverged from the original 
intention of the ship.18 
But not all of the Proceedings articles are critical of the LCS program.  In June 
2012, Edward Walsh wrote an article detailing a number of positive reports concerning 
the LCS program.  According to the article, the Navy is aware of the problems with the 
LCS program and the majority of the identified problems have already been addressed.19 
Another contradictory viewpoint comes from Patrick H. Stadt, an executive at 
Huntington-Ingalls Industries, who argues that the Navy should purchase a version of the 
Coast Guard NSC to fill the gaps left by the LCS in certain missions.20 Because Stadt’s 
company stands to build these ships, his objectivity is questionable.21 
The most important dissenting view comes from a study chaired by U.S. Navy 
(Ret). Captain Wayne P. Hughes called The New Navy Fighting Machine: A Study of the 
Connections between Contemporary Policy, Strategy, Sea Power, Naval Operations, and 
the Composition of the United States Fleet.22 Hughes argues that the Navy needs to create 
a special class of ships designed exclusively for combat in the littoral regions.  
Specifically, Hughes calls for the creation of what he calls a “coastal combat flotilla” 
comprised of small, heavily armed ships and large support vessels to be used to handle 
combat close to shore and other irregular missions.23 
 
                                                
18 Robert Carney Powers,  “Birth of the Littoral Combat Ship,” Proceedings, September 2012, 
accessed February 21, 2013,  http://www.usni.org//magazines/proceedings/2012-09-0/birth-littoral-combat-
ship. 
19 Edward J Walsh, “Naval Systems-Navy Disputes LCS Criticisms,” Proceedings, June 2012, 
accessed February 21, 2013, http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2012-06/naval-systems-navy-
disputes-lcs-criticisms, accessed. 
20 Patrick H Stadt, “Industry View: Why the Navy needs a “Patrol Frigate,” DoD Buzz, accessed 
February 21, 2013, http://www.dodbuzz.com/2012/03/28/industry-view-why-the-navy-needs-a-patrol-
frigate/.  
21 Patrick H. Stadt works as the corporate director of customer relations for Huntington-Ingalls 
Industries, the company responsible for the construction of the National Security Cutter. 
22 Wayne P. Hughes, Jr., “The New Navy Fighting Machine: A Study of the Connections Between 
Contemporary Policy, Strategy, Sea Power, Naval Operations, and the Composition of the United States 
Fleet,” (NPS Study NPSOR-09-002-PR, Naval Postgraduate School, 2009). 
23 Ibid, 19. 
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II. THE ROLE OF THE NAVY AND THE FLEET 
A. MISSION OF THE NAVY 
In October 2007, the Navy released a new strategic document titled A 
Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, which outline the missions and 
capabilities of the Navy.  According to this document, the mission of the Navy can be 
described in six strategic imperatives and the six core competencies that are derived from 
them.  The six strategic imperatives for the United States Navy are:  
• Limit regional conflict with forward deployed, decisive maritime powers 
• Deter major power war 
• Win our nation’s wars 
• Contribute to homeland defense in depth 
• Foster and sustain cooperative relationships with more international 
partners 
• Prevent or contain local disruptions before they impact the global 
system.24 
The six strategic imperatives are used to develop the core capacities that the Navy 
must maintain proficiency in.  These capabilities are: 
• Forward presence 
• Deterrence 
• Sea control 
• Power projection 
• Maritime security 
• Humanitarian assistance and disaster response.25 
The Navy maintains forward presence around the world through a combination of 
forward stationed forces and rotationally deployed forces.26 Forward stationed forces 
consist of the various naval units that are permanently based outside of the United States 
with the purpose of providing continuous naval presence in high-tension areas.  The 
                                                
24 A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, 9–11. 
25 Ibid., 12–14. 
26 2010 Naval Operations Concept, 26. 
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rotationally deployed forces consist of vessels homeported within the United States that 
deploy overseas on a rotating schedule.  The mixture of the forward deployed and 
rotationally deployed forces allows the Navy to maintain a worldwide presence to handle 
the entire spectrum of operations simultaneously.  But this system is not perfect.  There 
are benefits and drawbacks attached to having ships forward deployed or rotationally 
deployed.  Forward deployed ships have the advantage of location over the ships based in 
the United States. Drawbacks of forward deployed ships include the requirement of 
significant support from the host nation for basing and increased ship maintenance 
periods due to extended operational commitments.  Rotationally deployed forces do not 
require extensive facilities overseas to support their operations, but the number of ships 
required to maintain an overseas presence is increased greatly due to the time required to 
maintain, train, and deploy a ship from the United States to where it is needed.27 
The deterrence missions, both nuclear and conventional, have been one of the 
Navy’s more important roles.28 The nuclear deterrent power of the Navy lies in its ability 
to deliver a second strike in the event of a nuclear attack on the United States.  The 
conventional deterrent power of the Navy lies in its ability to use conventional forces and 
weaponry to strike anywhere in the world.  But recent events have required a 
reexamining of the nature of deterrence; no longer does the Navy only have to worry 
about deterring aggression on the part of state actors.  Now the Navy must ensure that it 
is able to deter aggression on the part of nonstate actors in addition to the traditional state 
actors.   
Sea control is another of the most essential and traditional missions of the United 
States Navy; without it, the Navy would not be able to operate globally with near 
impunity.29 The Navy defines sea control as, “the employment of naval forces, supported 
by land and air forces as appropriate, in order to achieve military objectives in vital sea 
areas.”30 Sea control has traditionally translated to the ability of the Navy to find and 
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destroy the enemy’s fleet, while protecting its own.  During the Cold War, this was 
straightforward.  Cold War-era sea control was based on the ability of the Navy to track 
Soviet submarines and surface ships and limit their ability to operated freely at sea.  But 
modern adversaries are not investing in traditional fleets.  Instead, they investing in new 
types of diesel submarines, heavily armed surface ships, land-based anti-ship missiles, 
ballistic anti-ship missiles, and fast attack craft.  As such, the sea control mission has 
evolved from denying the use of the sea to the enemy and into enforcing freedom of 
navigation and conducting antipiracy patrols, while at the same time maintaining the 
ability to destroy the enemy’s fleet.31 
Another mission of the Navy is power projection.  The Navy is able to directly 
project power from the sea onto land, either through the use of aircraft or through the use 
of guided missiles.32 The Navy is able to conduct strikes through the use of surface, 
submarine and air-launched weaponry.  Additionally, the Navy can project power by 
utilizing the amphibious capability of the Marine Corps.33 
Like sea control, maritime security has an essential mission of the U.S. Navy.  
The United States is, at its heart, a maritime nation and as such depends heavily on the 
sea for its prosperity and constantly works to ensure that the oceans are secure.34 The 
2010 Naval Operations Concept defines maritime security as “tasks and operations 
conducted to protect sovereignty and maritime resources, support free and open seaborne 
commerce, and to counter maritime related terrorism, weapons proliferation, 
transnational crime, piracy, environmental destruction, and illegal seaborne 
immigration.”35 But maritime security is more than just the actions of a single nation; the 
combined action of many nations working to improve their own maritime security 
improves the collective maritime security of all nations.  Individual maritime security 
consists of the actions undertaken by a single nation to provide for the safety and security 
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of its own ships and resources at sea.  Collective maritime security is the result of the 
combined actions of many nations to ensure that the oceans are safe for all nations to use.   
The U.S. Navy conducts a number of engagement and training missions with nations 
around the world to improve those nations’ ability to enforce maritime norms and laws.36 
The newest competency of the Navy is humanitarian assistance and disaster 
response (HA/DR).  Though HA/DR is not a traditional use of naval assets, the ships of 
the Navy are uniquely suited to this role and it has become one of the most common uses 
of naval assets.  From 1970 to 2000, the forces of the United States were involved in 366 
humanitarian missions compared to only 22 combat missions.37  Unlike other parts of the 
government, the Navy does not have to rely on ports and airfields in nations affected by 
disasters.  Navy ships have their own organic aviation lift assets, and amphibious assets 
are able to move people and goods from ship to shore without host nation port facilities.  
The HA/DR missions include support to civil authorities, humanitarian assistance, 
disaster relief, foreign assistance, humanitarian assistance, development assistance, 
environmental response operations, and security assistance.  HA/DR missions can be 
both reactive and proactive.  Reactive HA/DR occurs after a natural disaster, while 
proactive HA/DR works to strengthen host nation capabilities to recover from disasters 
before they occur.38 
B. HOMELAND DEFENSE 
Each of the core competencies is directly involved with the homeland defense 
(HD) imperative of the Navy to some extent.  Probably the most obvious are the 
deterrence, sea control, power projection, and forward presence missions.  Each of these 
missions works toward to preventing attacks on the U.S. homeland. The less obvious are 
the effects of maritime security and HA/DR on homeland defense.  Both maritime 
security and HA/DR missions work to build the capacities of other nations around the 
world to protect their own interests.  And by improving the capabilities of these nations to 
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handle internal issues like terrorism, proliferation, smuggling, and narcotics, the overall 
security of the United States improves.  By building up the capabilities of those nations 
less equipped to handle those issues, the United States is able to positively affect the 
homeland defense mission. 
In order to understand the role of the Navy in the HD mission, three concepts 
must be made clear.  The first of these concepts is the homeland and its size.  The official 
definition of the homeland is the “physical region that includes the continental United 
States, Alaska, Hawaii, U.S. territories and possessions, and surrounding territorial waters 
and airspace.”39  The United States covers an area of 3,794,100 square miles, has land 
boundaries of 7,478 miles, and 12,380 miles of coastline, which makes the United States 
the third largest territory in the world.40  This does not cover the area of the sixteen 
additional territories and possessions of the United States.41  The second concept of HD 
is that the homeland is vulnerable.  The U.S. government believes that the homeland is 
“is exposed to the possibility of harm from hostile states or non-state actors” and as such 
must be protected from outside attack.42  It is the role of the Department of Defense to 
ensure that threats are met and handled well before they reach the United States.43  And 
as the primary instrument of national security, it falls on the military to protect the 
homeland.  The Department of Defense is the primary agent for homeland defense.44  The 
third concept of HD is that HD is different from homeland security (HS).  HS is focused 
internally, while HD has an external focus.  The role of HS is to protect the United States 
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from attacks originating from within.  The 2007 National Security Strategy for Homeland 
Security defines homeland security as, “a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist 
attacks within the United States, reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and 
minimize the damage from and recover from attacks that do occur.”45  HS missions can 
occur simultaneously across all levels of government, from the local, tribal, state, or 
federal levels.  JP 3-27, Homeland Defense, defines homeland defense as the “protection 
of U.S. sovereignty, territory, domestic population, and critical defense infrastructure 
against external threats and aggression, or other threats as directed by the President.” 46  
Because HD missions deal with external threats to the sovereignty of the United States, 
they only occur at the national level. 
The variety of HD missions can further be broken down into three categories: 
traditional, civil support, or emergency preparedness.  The traditional HD mission 
involves projecting national power in order to deter, prevent, or disrupt an attack against 
the United States.47  Civil support (CS) missions are the use of traditional military 
capabilities providing either assistance to domestic and foreign governments or law 
enforcement agencies.48  The Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support defines 
CS as, “DoD support, including Federal military forces, the Department’s career civilian 
and contractor personnel, and DoD agency and component assets, for domestic 
emergencies and for designated law enforcement and other activities.”49  Even though CS 
missions fall under HD, the DoD is legally restricted to a supporting role by the 1878 
Posse Comitatus Act.50  DoD assets may operate in the CS role, but require specific 
Congressional authorization to do so.  These missions may range from responding to a 
                                                
45 Department of Defense, National Strategy for Homeland Security, (Washington, DC: Government 
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50 U.S. Government Accountability Office, DOD Can Enhance Efforts to Identify Capabilities to 
Support Civil Authorities during Disasters GAO-03-670 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 
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major disaster, restoring order during a civil disturbance, responding to a chemical, 
biological, radiological, or nuclear incident, and providing support for national special 
events.51  Congressional authorization to operate domestically has been granted to the 
DoD for participating in drug interdiction and certain law enforcement missions, 
protecting of civil rights, suppressing insurrection, assisting the U.S. Secret Service, 
protecting nuclear materials, assisting with the response to terrorist incidents involving 
weapons of mass destruction, and executing and enforcing of quarantine.52  The 
emergency preparedness (EP) responsibility of the DoD consists of any and all measures 
undertaken before a disaster meant to mitigate the loss or damage to life, property, or 
national institutions.53  Most importantly, the DoD does not consider EP a separate 
mission set.  The EP exists as a constant state of preparedness that results from the 
preparation for the DoD’s HD and CS role.54 
The DoD has identified eight mission types that fall under the umbrella of HD and 
CS and all of them are well suited to naval assets.  These eight missions are: identify the 
threat, deter our enemies from courses of action which may pose a threat to the United 
States, defend the homeland and deny the enemy’s access to the United States airspace, 
territory, and territorial seas, ensure access to space and information, protect defense 
critical infrastructure, deter aggression through global operations, defeat the enemy when 
deterrence fails, and recover from any attack or incident.55  A number of these missions 
are identical to the missions of the Navy.  The Navy’s deterrence mission is directly 
linked to the HD deterrence mission.  The sea control mission of the Navy is directly 
linked to ensuring access to space and information.  The forward presence mission of the 
Navy serves as both a deterrent and method of access denial.  The power projection 
capability enhances the ability of the nation to defeat their enemies. 
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1. The Regions of Homeland Defense 
In order to protect the homeland, the U.S. government has conceptually divided 
the world into three distinct regions, based partially on geography, partially on the 
capabilities of the Navy and the Coast Guard, and partially based the expected 
capabilities of the enemy.56  These three regions are the homeland, the approaches, and 
the forward regions.   
The first region is the homeland, which consists of the United States and its 
territorial waters and airspace.  The military is specifically prohibited from operating in 
anything more than a supporting role by the 1878 Posse Comitatus Act.57 Only agencies 
with law enforcement responsibilities are allowed to operate in this region in a 
supervisory role.  DoD assets are required to play a supporting role in maritime 
operations in the homeland.  The DoD has a number of missions in this region which 
include deterring and defeating direct attacks against the United States, supporting civil 
authorities and law enforcement personnel in support of counterterror operations as 
directed by the president, and providing chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and 
explosives consequence management support to civilian authorities.58 
The next region, the approaches, consists of the land, water, and airspace around 
the United States through which all traffic enters the homeland and extends out to 
international waters and airspace.59  Forces in this region are responsible for locating 
threats before they reach the homeland and defeating them, if necessary.60  This region is 
one of blended control and operations.  Because the law limits the ability of the DoD to 
operate in a law enforcement capacity, Navy ships are required to take on a Coast Guard 
law enforcement detachment while conducting operations in the approaches.  In the 
approaches, the Navy conducts operations in support of the War on Drugs, monitors and 
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58 DoD, Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, 12. 
59 Ibid, 11; CJCS, JP 3-27, I-5. 
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interdicts suspected smugglers with the support of the Coast Guard, as well as conducts 
normal maritime military operations. 
The third layer is the forward regions.  The forward regions consist of all foreign 
territory, airspace, and waterspace.61  The role of the military in the forward regions is to 
project power and deter, detect, prevent attacks, and destroy any and all threats to the 
homeland.62  Military operations in this region can occur simultaneously across the entire 
range of military operations, from engagement and national building operations all the 
way to direct action missions and global strikes.63  Unlike the homeland and the 
approaches, the Navy takes the lead as the primary agent for maritime operations in this 
region.   
Dividing the oceans allows for the government to divide the responsibility of each 
region between the various Services and Agencies.  Ideally, the U.S. Navy takes charge 
of the efforts in the furthest regions from the homeland and leaves the protecting of the 
homeland to the Coast Guard.  But the sheer size of the problem combined with the 
limited assets available to the Coast Guard and blended nature of the approaches means 
that the Navy cannot ignore the HD mission. 
2. Homeland Defense Missions 
The addition of the non-traditional homeland defense missions to the traditional 
missions of the Navy has forced the service to address a number of new missions.  The 
environment that the Navy finds itself in—the post-Cold War period—is full of 
nontraditional threats. The Navy has been forced to evolve by assuming a number of 
nontraditional roles. in order to counter these threats.  The Navy must now conduct a 
number of new missions, such as counter-piracy, counternarcotic, maritime security and 
engagement.  It is not cost effective to send a modern destroyer or cruiser on these low 
threat missions; their capabilities are better utilized on their primary warfare areas. The 
ideal ships for the HD missions are frigates or corvettes, which have the small size that 
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allows them to work with and train local forces without overwhelming them and the 
offensive capabilities to operate as a part of traditional, large-scale naval operations as 
needed. 
a. Counter-piracy. 
Piracy is one of the oldest crimes and has existed for thousands of years.  
But for most of modern history, piracy has been a nuisance rather than a concern.  During 
the latter part of the 1990s pirate activity began to climb around the world, especially in 
the Straits of Malacca and off of the Horn of Africa.  Between 2000 and 2009, there were 
approximately 3500 incidents of maritime piracy, with only 16 percent of those attacks 
occurring off of Africa.64  Due to increased presence off the Horn of Africa, piracy in that 
area has declined somewhat, but has increased in the Gulf of Guinea off the Atlantic 
coast of the continent. 
Piracy is a general term used to describe three different types of crimes at 
sea.  One type is the robbery of ships while in port.  Pirates in this kind of attack are 
normally after cash and small, high-value items that can be removed quickly.65  Another 
type of piracy is attacks against ships on the open seas with the intent of holding the 
ships, crew, and cargo for ransom.66  A third type of piracy consists of vessels being 
hijacked with the express purpose of stealing both the ship and cargo, giving the ship a 
fake registration, taking on a fresh cargo, and then stealing the new cargo.  These vessels 
tend to be the smaller freighters used to take cargo regionally, rather than transoceanic.  
These ships are continuously given fake names and registrations until they are captured 
or abandoned.67  Of these three types of attacks, only the second is of major concern to 
the world.  The pirating of an oil tanker or bulk cargo carrier could have worldwide 
                                                
64 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), The Globalization of Crime: A 
Transnational Organized Crime Threat Assessment (Vienna, Austria: United Nations, 2010), 193. 
65 Peter Chalk, The Maritime Dimension of International Security: Terrorism, Piracy, and Challenges 
for the United States (Santa Monica, California: Rand, 2008), 5. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Ibid., 6. 
 17 
economic and political implications.  The first and third categories of piracy are a 
criminal nuisance, but their impact is negligible.   
It is difficult to accurately describe the impact of piracy on the 
international economy; shipping companies make incomplete reports of attempted acts of 
piracy for fear of increased insurance premiums or ships being stuck in port while 
investigations happen.  It is estimated that less than 50 percent of pirate attacks are 
reported to the International Maritime Bureau.68  With the average pirated vessel fetching 
from $500,000 to $2 million in ransom, it is estimated that piracy costs the world 
somewhere from $1 billion to $16 billion per year.69  But the cost of piracy is more than 
just monetary.  Piracy undermines legitimate governments and the ransoms serve to prop 
up illegitimate governments. Piracy is one of the few missions of the military that is 
explicitly described in the Constitution and one of the oldest missions of the U.S. Navy.  
Section 8 of Article 1 of the U.S. Constitution gives Congress the power to, “To define 
and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the 
Law of Nations.”70  Some of the first missions of the Navy were raids against the pirates 
operating out of what is modern-day Libya.  More recently, the Navy has found itself 
again participating in widespread counter-piracy operations around the world, but 
specifically off the Horn of Africa in conjunction with the NATO through Operation 
OCEAN SHIELD.71 
There are a number of reasons why piracy is a major concern.  Most 
importantly, the oceans are essential to the world’s economy.  It is estimated that at any 
one time there are somewhere between 15 to 16 million containers and as much as 
 6 billion tons of crude oil and bulk materials on the sea at any one time.  Next, many of 
the most important sea-lanes and maritime chokepoints are located along failed or failing 
states.  These regions create a unique mixture of ships being geographically concentrated 
                                                
68 Ibid., 7. 
69 Ibid., 16. 
70 U.S. Constitution, Art. I, § 8, cl. 10. 
71 NATO, “Operation Ocean Shield”, http://www.aco.nato.int/page208433730.aspx, accessed March 
3, 2013. 
 18 
and slowed down in areas with a lack of international customs enforcement.  Pirates in 
these regions benefit from the weak or failed state governments, often employing bribes 
and protection to allow pirates to operate.  The sheer number of ships transiting the 
Straits of Malacca, Gulf of Aden, and Bab El-Mandab and the number of small craft in 
these areas lets the pirates blend in easily in to the background and access to more ships 
than can possibly be protected.  Finally, some attribute the rise in piracy to the worldwide 
economic recession that occurred in the first part of the 21st Century.  Lack of economic 
opportunities drove people into crime, and piracy is an easy and relatively inexpensive 
option.  The economic downturn in conjunction with the decreased maritime security and 
the sheer enormity problem has limited the ability of many poorer nations to patrol their 
own waters.72 
b. Counter-narcotics 
Law enforcement in support of the War on Drugs has been a secondary 
mission of the Navy for decades.  Beginning in the 1980s, the Navy began conducting 
operations in support of the War on Drugs off the coasts of South America and the 
Caribbean Sea.  With as many as four Navy ships, typically frigates but sometimes a 
destroyer, operating in conjunction with the Coast Guard and other law enforcement 
agencies, the maritime war on drugs has cost upwards of $20 billion over the past decade 
alone.73  Traditionally, smugglers utilized fishing boats and high-speed vessels known as 
go-fast boats to move drugs.  These boats are able to carry approximately three tons of 
cocaine per trip with a value of about $75 million.74  But the advanced technology and 
capabilities of the U.S. military have made it increasingly risky to transport drugs along 
normal channels.  To counter this, the drug smugglers have evolved their tactics to 
improve their chances of avoiding detection. 
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The drug trafficking organizations have begun constructing vessels 
specifically designed to be difficult to detect. Known as self-propelled semi-submersibles 
(SPSS), these vessels represent a revolution in drug smuggling technology.  Constructed 
using a combination of fiberglass and steel, SPSS are designed with a minimum amount 
of freeboard make visual and radar detection difficult.  The SPSS have a crew of four to 
five people and are able to stay at sea for up ten days.  These vessels cost approximately 
$2 million to construct and are able to carry an average of ten tons of drugs per trip.75 
Recently, a new type of drug smuggling vessel has been discovered in the jungles 
of South America.  Criminal organizations developed a completely submersible vessel to 
smuggle drugs.  Crewed by four to six men, these narco-subs are able to transport as 
much as twelve tons of cocaine the entire distance from South America to the United 
States.76  These ships are very difficult to detect while they are on the surface due to their 
low freeboard.  But some are also able to completely submerge and remain submerged 
for more than 18 hours operating on battery power before having to surface and recharge 
their batteries.77  With a craft costing about $2 million to build, and the estimated profit 
from one narco-sub trip at over $250 million, the risks are well worth the rewards.78  
Though this technology has not been used to smuggle anything but drugs, it is not 
difficult to imagine a narco-sub being used to transport human cargo, terrorists, or 
weapons of mass destruction into the United States undetected. 
c. Maritime Counter-insurgency 
Another major threat at sea is the rise of maritime insurgency.  Often 
linked to piracy and weapons and drug smuggling, maritime insurgency is no longer just 
used to fund and supply operations ashore.  Insurgent groups have discovered that the sea 
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provides unique opportunities.  Insurgent groups have begun operating at sea for the same 
reasons that pirates and smugglers do – the sea provides almost unlimited mobility, and 
its enormity makes detection very difficult.  Additionally, with the economic vitality of 
the world dependent on the oceans for trade, attacks at sea can have just as much effect as 
an attack on a target on land. 
Attacks at sea for reasons other than economic gain have been rare.  
Probably the two most famous are the attack on the USS Cole (DDG-67) in October of 
2000 and the seizure of the Achille Lauro in 1985.79  But these are far from the only cases 
of terrorism against ships at sea.  In 2002, a small boat rammed and exploded next to the 
French oil tanker Limburg off the coast of Yemen that resulted in the death of one 
crewmember and the release of 90,000 barrels of oil into the ocean.80  Another case of 
maritime terrorism occurred in 2004 when an attack took place on the Iraqi oil terminals 
in the Persian Gulf.  Using speedboats filled with explosives, terrorists attempted to 
destroy the oil terminals, which would have destabilized the world economy through 
rising oil prices.81  In 2004, a bomb set off by a member of the Abu Sayyaf terrorist 
organization exploded and sank the Superferry 14 off the coast of the Philippines and 
killed over 100 people.82  Finally, the best example or maritime terrorism occurred during 
the 20-year long Sri Lanka civil war, in which the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam 
formed a sea cadre known as the Sea Tigers.  The Sea Tigers conducted multiple raids 
and attacks against Sri Lankan forces and demonstrated how cheaply and effectively a 
maritime insurgency can be conducted.83  The risk of maritime insurgency cannot be 
understated.  The ramifications of a sunken oil tanker or cruise ship would be politically 
and economically enormous. 
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d. Maritime Engagement 
The final type of mission associated with HD is maritime engagement.  
Maritime engagement missions serve to increase the individual maritime security of 
nations around the world through the training and mentoring of partner-nation naval 
forces by members of the U.S. Navy.  By improving the partner-nation’s ability to secure 
their territorial waters, the U.S. Navy is able to improve collective maritime security 
around the world.  The U.S. Navy provides training to partner-nation forces on 
seamanship, small boat maintenance, search and rescue, law enforcement and vessel 
boarding, and maritime law.84 
One of the largest problems in conducting maritime engagement missions 
is dealing with the difference between the capabilities of the U.S. Navy vessels and those 
of the partner-nation.  These nations often do not have traditional navies or coast guards 
and it is important that the training conducted does not go beyond what the partner-nation 
is capable of. 
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III. THE FLEET 
In general terms, a fleet can be described in terms of the capabilities that its ships 
maintain and how those capabilities might be used.  Capabilities can be broadly described 
in four mission areas.85  The first mission of a navy is to ensure the ability of a nation to 
move goods and ships freely across the oceans, as well as ensuring the safety of special 
assets like ballistic missile submarines.86  The second role of a navy is to deny the enemy 
the ability to freely use the oceans.87  The third core function of a navy is the ability to 
provide goods and services to forces ashore.  A navy is required to put a land force ashore 
to hold territories, as well as provide them with logistical and fire support.88  The fourth 
and final competency of a navy is to prevent the enemy from being able to land forces 
ashore and support them by sea.89  It is essential that the design of the fleet reflect the 
missions being done. 
A. CURRENT FLEET DESIGN 
The U.S. fleet is designed around two composite structures called the carrier 
strike group (CSG) and the amphibious ready group (ARG).  The CSG and ARG are 
unique constructs that give the United States significant power projection and strike 
capabilities around the world without the need for extensive diplomatic clearances and 
concerns.  The Navy can deploy a CSG or ARG off the coast of a nation in order to 
provide stability or influence events or in preparation to conduct operations.  A CSG is 
normally composed of a single nuclear-powered aircraft carrier (CVN), a carrier air wing, 
approximately five surface combatants (CG or DDG), one nuclear-powered attack 
submarine (SSN), and one Military Sealift Command supply ship.90  The exact number of 
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ships can be increased as mission requirements dictate.  The composition and capabilities 
of the individual units of the CSG allows for it to conduct missions across the entire 
spectrum of operations, from ballistic missile defense down to maritime security.91  The 
Navy currently maintains a 3-2-1 readiness posture for its carrier fleets.  This posture 
requires that three CSGs are deployed, two CVN be ready for deployment within 30 days 
of notification, and a third CVN ready within 90 days.92  CSG excel in many of the 
traditional naval roles but the size and types of ships in a CSG limit their ability to 
effectively conduct maritime security and HA/DR missions.  The complexity of these 
ships make them inefficient platforms for conducting maritime engagement and their lack 
of amphibious assets hinder their ability to conduct HA/DR missions. 
An ARG normally is composed of one large amphibious assault ship (LHA or 
LHD), an assortment of amphibious transport dock (LPD) and dock landing ships (LSD), 
and a SSN.  Additionally, an ARG will deploy with one or more surface combatants to 
provide the air defense, undersea warfare, and strike capabilities.93  Like the CSG, the 
ARG is able to project power ashore with its limited strike capabilities; but the majority 
of the power projection comes from the embarked Marine units and their capabilities.  
ARGs excel in the forward presence, HA/DR, and amphibious assault roles.94 
The third component of the fleet is the small combatant ships, such as the 
minesweepers and the frigates.  Frigates (FFG) were designed during the Cold War to 
provide an antisubmarine warfare capability for amphibious forces, underway 
replenishment groups and merchant convoys.95  The FFG in the U.S. Navy have a very 
limited air defense and anti-surface capability but are very capable in working the non-
traditional missions of antipiracy, counter-narcotics, maritime security, and engagement.  
The minesweepers (MCM) were designed to locate, classify, and destroy both moored 
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and bottom mines.96  Both the FFG and MCM are no longer in production and are being 
decommissioned in anticipation of the LCS. 
B. CONSIDERATIONS IN CONSTRUCTING A FLEET  
Of all the considerations taken into account when building a fleet, two are the 
most important: fleet cost and ship capabilities.  These two issues need to be factored in 
when considering the overall missions of those ships. 
1. Type 
Two of the most prominent naval strategists, Alfred Thayer Mahan and Julian 
Corbett, grouped naval units into three categories.  These categories are the battle fleet, 
cruisers, and flotillas.97  At the center of traditional navies is the battle fleet, which 
consists of the capital ships and their escorts with the mission of engaging and destroying 
the enemy’s battle fleet for the purpose of winning command of the seas.98  Traditionally, 
the battle fleet consisted of battleships and their escorts, but in the modern navy the battle 
fleet is centered on the aircraft carriers and their battle groups.  In the U.S. Navy today, 
the battle fleet consists of the CSG and the ARG.  The second category of naval vessels is 
what Corbett described as the “cruisers.”  Cruisers are any vessels designed to locate and 
attack the enemy’s commercial shipping and protect allied shipping.  Traditionally, 
cruisers were lightly armed and armored when compared to battleships, but had 
significant advantages in range, speed, and unit cost.  Originally these vessels were 
pirates or surface raiders.  But since the end of the First World War, these surface 
combatants have been replaced by submarines, and since the end of the Second World 
War, the submarines have been augmented with long-range, shore-based anti-ship aircraft 
and missiles.99  Corbett believed that a nation couldn’t be victorious at sea with only a 
battle fleet; having a fleet of cruisers was essential to counter enemy raiders or to conduct 
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a guerre de course.100  Guerre de course, or commerce raiding, denies the enemy the 
ability to operate at sea with impunity, as well as forcing it to divide its battle fleet or risk 
its commercial shipping.  And because of this, Corbett argued that a nation with a strong 
navy needed to construct a balanced fleet with cruisers to protect its shipping, while at the 
same time being able to conduct operations against enemy shipping.101  The third 
category of ships is the flotilla.  According to Corbett, flotillas must be composed of 
small ships capable of both operating in the littorals that would normally be too 
hazardous for capital ships and providing escort to the battle fleet and cruisers in 
hazardous waters.  These ships would have a limited range and operational duration, but 
would have enough firepower like torpedoes and missiles to conduct operations against 
larger opponents utilizing stealth, surprise, and superior numbers.102 
2. Cost 
The second consideration in building a fleet is cost.  The availability of funding 
must be taken into account, especially during times of peace when the government has 
normally cut funding to the military.  As ships and systems have become more complex, 
the cost to build a fleet has increased dramatically.  Between 1967 and 2005, the average 
cost of a guided missile destroyer increased by more than 123 percent, and the cost of a 
nuclear-powered attack submarine rose by 401 percent.103  In 1967, the average cost of a 
guided missile destroyer was $515 million FY 2005 dollars and the average cost of a 
nuclear-powered attack submarine was $484 FY2005 dollars.  By 2005, the average cost 
of a guided missile destroyer rose to $1.148 billion FY2005 dollars and the cost of a 
nuclear-powered attack submarine rose to $2.427 FY2005 dollars.104  There are a number 
of reasons as to why the cost of the cost of ships has increased but Mark Arena describes 
them as the economy-driven factors and the customer-driven factors.   
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The first factors, the economy-driven, are the aspects of shipbuilding that are 
normally outside the influence of the government, such as the cost of labor, materials, 
and installed equipment.105  And of those three factors, the majority of the cost comes 
from the labor and the installed equipment.  Between 1977 and 2005, labor costs ran 
between 30 and 50 percent of the final cost of a ship at U.S. naval shipyards.106  The 
most expensive parts of a ship are the pieces of equipment and systems installed on it.  
The cost of the equipment installed on a Navy warship comprises over 40 percent of its 
total cost and continues to rise as the cost of technology increases.107  The material cost 
of the ship has remained relatively constant and does not make of a significant portion of 
the overall cost of a ship.  On average, the material cost of a ship only composes 15 
percent of the final value.108  Even though these factors compose most of the actual cost 
of the ship, they are only responsible for half the increase on the cost of a Navy ship. 
The second reason for the increasing cost of a warship is the customer-driven 
factors.109  Customer-driven factors are those factors determined by the purchaser and 
can range from the types of systems installed to the number of ships built.  The largest 
component of the Navy customer-driven growth is complexity.  Mark Arena defines 
complexity as the difficulty and level of effort required to plan, construct, and outfit a 
ship.110  As any one of those factors increases, the overall complexity of the ship 
increases and the cost of the warship increases.111   Additionally, complexity increases as 
a result of the secondary factors that increase as government priorities change.  The 
traditional factors that affect the capabilities of the warship include the displacement, the 
number and type of weapon, the amount of armor on the ship, the speed of the ship, and 
the acquisition cost of the ship.112  But governmental priorities and regulations have 
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dictated that factors such as survivability, reaction time, reliability, maintainability, 
endurance, pollution control, seakeeping, habitability, radar signature, noise signature, 
sensor range, and total life-cycle cost be taken into account in ship design.113  Over the 
last 50 years, changes to these areas have resulted in an unanticipated increase in both the 
size of the ships and their complexity, which increase the cost of the ship considerably.   
Procurement rate and methods also influence the final cost of a warship.  The rate 
at which the ships are procured and the number of locations where the ships are built 
plays a significant role in determining the final cost of a warship.114  Higher procurement 
rates allow for the shipbuilders to scale up their production and drive costs down.  
Shipyards are more likely to invest in cost-saving measures and efficiency improvements 
when ships are procured in larger numbers.115  The incentive to produce ships effectively 
does not exist at low procurement levels because shipyards need to stretch out production 
times to stay open.  The Navy often utilizes multiple construction yards when procuring 
new ships in order to keep multiple shipyards operating as a matter of national security 
and maintaining jobs.  The use of multiple yards does have an effect on lowering the cost 
of the ship and often causes the final cost to increase.116  With modern weapons and 
sensor systems driving up the cost of warship construction, it is essential that every effort 
be made to keep the overall cost of the ship low while still providing the needed 
capabilities.  If the Navy seeks to continue contributing to the HD mission, the Navy 
needs to work to keep complexity and technology costs to a minimum and create a vessel 
that can serve as a medium to low-end combatant with existing technologies and designs 
but sufficient to serve less demanding missions such as offshore patrol and homeland 
defense. 
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IV. CURRENT FLEET CAPABILITIES 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the current state of medium- to low-end 
combatants in the U.S. Navy.  Currently, the U.S. Navy has no combatant that is designed 
specifically to operate at this level.  The primary platform for HD missions, the Oliver 
Hazard Perry (OHP) class frigates, were initially designed as an anti-submarine ship 
during the Cold War and only began operating as an HD platform when they were no 
lingered needed in their primary role.  To replace these aging ships, the Navy began 
developing the LCS.  The LCS is designed to provide modular combatant capabilities 
across three different warfare areas.  This chapter reviews current and planned 
capabilities in these small combatants before turning to a critique of Navy plans in 
Chapter V. 
A. OLIVER HAZARD PERRY CLASS 
 
Figure 1.  USS De Wert (FFG-45) (From IHS Jane’s, 2012) 
The OHP class of frigates was designed at the height of the Cold War to provide 
open ocean escorts for convoys and amphibious units crossing the Atlantic Ocean in the 
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event of another war in Europe.  Since the end of the Cold War, the OHP have excelled 
in the non-traditional realm of homeland defense operations – counter-narcotics, counter-
proliferation, counter smuggling, and counter piracy.117  The Navy initially constructed 
51 OHP frigates between 1973 and 1984 at an average cost of $650 million per ship.118  
As of 2013, only 23 of the original OHP are still in service with the U.S. Navy and all 
should be decommissioned by 2017 and replaced by the LCS.119 
The OHP have a length of 453.1 feet, a beam of 44.9 feet, a maximum draft of 
24.6 feet, and a full load displacement of 4166 tons.120  The OHP class is powered by 
two LM2500 gas turbine engines driving a single shaft with two retractable auxiliary 
propulsion units for slow speed maneuvering.121  The OHP frigates have a maximum 
speed of 29 knots and a maximum range of 4500 nautical miles at 20 knots.122  The OHP 
frigates are designed for a crew of 15 officers, 200 enlisted personnel, with an additional 
19 personnel as part of the aviation detachment.123 
The OHP class ships are equipped with a Raytheon SPS-49(V)4 or 5 air search 
radar system, an ISC Cardion SPS-55 surface search radar system, a Sperry Mk 92 fire 
control radar system, and a Furuno navigation radar.124  For subsurface search, the OHP 
are equipped with a SQQ 89(V)2 sonar suite, consisting of a Raytheon SWS 56 hull 
mounted sonar and a Gould SQR 19 passive towed array, allowing them to conduct 
antisubmarine operations.125  For defense, the OHP class ships are armed with one OTO 
Melara 76-millimeter/62 caliber gun system and one General Electric/General Dynamics 
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20-millimeter Mk 15 1B Vulcan Phalanx gun system.126  Additionally, two Boeing 25-
millimeter Mk 38 guns can be mounted amidships.127  The OHP class ships were 
originally armed a single Mk 13 missile launcher with a 40 round missile magazine.  The 
Mk 13 was capable of firing the SM-1MR missile and Harpoon anti-ship missiles.  The 
Mk 13 missile launcher was removed after the SM-1MR was phased out of U.S. service, 
but remains installed on OHP in foreign navies, leaving the OHP with a very limited air 
defense capability and no strike capability.  The 128OHP class frigates have facilities for 
two SH-60 helicopters.129 
B. LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP (LCS) 
The LCS program is one of the most unique concepts ever attempted by the Navy.  
The capabilities of the LCS are supposed to revolutionize how the Navy operates, 
especially in the littoral region.  By incorporating modular design features into a common 
hull type, each LCS should be able to undertake a variety of missions for a reduced cost.  
Each LCS hull is built with only a minimum of installed capabilities and is to be operated 
by a minimum number of personnel.  The actual capabilities of the ship will come from 
the installed mission modules.  The LCS hull has space set aside for the installation of 
one of three different mission modules, which will allow the LCS to conduct that specific 
mission.  The modularity of the LCS hull is designed to allow the mission modules to be 
changed out rapidly while in port as the need for additional capabilities in a region 
evolve.  In the early 1990s, the Navy realized that the ending of the Cold War and the 
changing international security environment required that the Navy begin to evolve as 
well. 
The genesis of the LCS can be traced to the end of the Cold War and the shift in 
Navy strategy away from preparing to fight a monolithic, continental enemy to being an 
expeditionary force designed to handle multiple regional conflicts.  Both the 1992 
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…From the Sea and the 1994 Forward…From the Sea white papers discuss the need of 
the Navy to increasingly operate in the littoral regions that were not traditionally part of 
blue water fleet operations.130  In the mid-1990s, the Navy conducted a series of 
wargames to help to identify the sorts of technologies and vessels that would be useful in 
littoral combat.  Utilizing state of the art modeling and simulation technology, the Navy 
was able to evaluate a number of developmental platforms and systems.  Among the 
unmanned systems evaluated: were unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), unmanned 
underwater vehicles (UUV), unmanned surface vehicles (USV), airborne surface warfare 
and mine countermeasures systems, and hypothetical platforms and weapons systems.  
Played against the backdrop of the Straits of Hormuz, these wargames identified a 
number of problems with the current fleet that greatly affected their ability to operate in 
the littoral region.  Specifically, the results of the wargames demonstrated that the fleet, 
while capable of handling the task of littoral combat, was not the ideal.  What should 
have been a simple and quick operation, ended up lasting a number of simulated weeks.  
Large surface combatants ended up with heavy damage from the expected sources (shore-
based aircraft, submarines, and shore-based anti-ship missile batteries), and from 
unexpected sources (mines and gunboats).  The results of these wargames led to the 
realization that the Navy needed a ship capable of operating in the littoral regions.  The 
Navy needed a smaller class of ship to operate effectively in the littoral region.  These 
ships were imagined to be expendable, more than the larger, traditional warships.  Later 
war gaming found that the LCS (as initially designed) was also ideal for maritime 
interdiction, intelligence collection, the escort of larger ships through the littoral region, 
and support of special forces operations.131  The Navy’s continuing evolution towards 
operating in the littoral regions resulted in the development of the Streetfighter concept of 
the late 1990s.  In 1998, Vice Admiral Arthur Cebrowski developed four themes that he 
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believed to be essential to the future of maritime power in the United States.132  Vice 
Admiral Cebrowski advocated that the Navy develop to become a network-centric force 
with distributed sensors and weapons systems; that the Navy needed to be able to collect, 
interpret, and evaluate sensor information faster than the enemy; that the Navy needed to 
be able overcome coastal defenses to enable air and ground forces to conduct operations 
in enemy territory; and that the Navy needed to increase the size of its fleet in order to 
ensure success in both littoral combat and peacetime missions.133  These four themes led 
to the development of the Streetfighter.   
The Streetfighter concept divided the fleet up into two groups, the Economy A 
forces and Economy B forces.134  The Economy A force was composed of the traditional 
fleet.  These ships would continue to provide the power projection and strike capabilities 
to the Navy.  The Economy B force, or the Streetfighter ships, would be new class of 
ships with a displacement of less than 1000 tons that were designed to employ networked 
capabilities and maneuver to fight in the littoral regions.  Most importantly, these ships 
would have significant organic offensive capability and some degree of modularity that 
would allow them to operate independently or at the squadron or fleet levels.135  The 
ships in the Economy B force were supposed to be affordable and expendable.  The 
distributed and networked nature of this force meant that the loss of one ship would not 
significantly reduce the overall combat effectiveness of the force, like the loss of a single 
ship would from the Economy A forces.136 
In late July 2000, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Vern Clark, ordered a 
study be conducted on the feasibility of the Streetfighter concept.  Following soon 
afterwards, the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review mandated a change in the future fleet 
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of the Navy.  What was originally supposed to be a single, advanced combatant (the DD-
21 program) was broken up into three ships (the DD(X), CG(X), and LCS).137  On 1 
November 2001, the LCS program was officially stood up with the creation of the LCS 
Program Office.  The LCS program office decided that the LCS would be a modular 
design and would have three primary missions.  These three missions are antisubmarine 
warfare (ASW), mine countermeasures (MCM), and surface warfare (SUW) in the 
littorals.   Secondary to the three primary missions, the LCS would be able to conduct 
maritime engagement and partnership, maritime intercept, surveillance and intelligence 
gathering, the support of special forces, and homeland defense missions.  As of 
December 2012, the Navy intends to procure 55 LCS and 64 mission modules (16 ASW, 
24 MCM, 24 SUW).138  The Navy intended that each LCS would take two years to build 
at a cost of $260 million, but now it is estimated that each LCS will take three years to 
build at a cost of almost $700 million.139 
In 2004, the Navy awarded contracts to both Lockheed Martin and General 
Dynamics to design two different versions of the LCS.  Each version of the LCS is being 
constructed to a radically different design and with radically different sensors and combat 
systems.  The Lockheed Martin variant of the LCS is being constructed at Marinette 
Marine Shipyard in Marinette, Wisconsin.  The General Dynamics version of the LCS is 
being constructed at the Austral USA shipyard in Mobile, Alabama. 
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1. Freedom class 
 
Figure 2.  USS Freedom (LCS-1) (From IHS Jane’s, 2012) 
The Freedom (LCS-1) class of Littoral Combat Ship has a length of 378.3 feet, a 
beam of 57.4 feet, a draft of 13.5 feet, and a full load displacement of 3354 tons.140  Two 
Rolls Royce MT-30 gas turbine engines and two Fairbanks Morse Colt-Pielstick 16PA6B 
diesel engines in a Combined Diesel and Gas (CODAG) arrangement power the Freedom 
class ships.  The CODAG arrangement allows the ship to operate on either the gas turbine 
or the diesel engines, depending on how much power is needed.  These four engines 
power four Rolls Royce Kamewa 153SII waterjets and give the Freedom class a 
maximum speed of 40 knots and a maximum range of 3500 nautical miles at 14 knots.141  
The Freedom class ships have a crew of 60 personnel with space for an additional 15 as 
part of the aviation detachment and 25 as part of the mission module detachment.142 
                                                




The Freedom class ships are equipped with an EADS TRS-3D air and surface 
search radar, a Sperry Bridgemaster navigation radar, and a FABA DORNA fire control 
radar.143  The Freedom class has no installed sonar.144 
The Freedom class ships are armed with a BAE Systems 57 millimeter/70 caliber 
gun system, four 12.7-millimeter machine guns, and a Raytheon Rolling Airframe 
Missile RIM-116 Mk 99 surface-to-air missile (SAM) launcher.145  Additional weapons 
capabilities can be added with the addition of mission modules.  The Freedom class ships 
have a hangar large enough for either two MH-60 R/S helicopters or a single MH-60 R/S 
helicopter and three vertical takeoff UAV.146 
2. Independence class 
 
Figure 3.  USS Independence (LCS-2) (From IHS Jane’s, 2012) 






The Independence (LCS-2) class ships have a length of 417 feet, a beam of 103 
feet, a draft of 14.8 feet, and a full load displacement of 2841 tons.147  The Freedom class 
ships are powered by two General Electric LM2500 gas turbine engines and two MTU 
20V 8000 diesel engines arranged as CODAG which power four Wärtsilä waterjets and a 
single steerable thruster unit.  The Independence class has a maximum speed of 40 knots 
and a maximum range of 3500 nautical miles at 14 knots.148  The LCS-2 class ships have 
a crew of 60 personnel with space for an additional 15 personnel as part of the air 
detachment and 25 personnel as part of the mission module detachment.149 
The Independence class ships are equipped with an Ericson Sea Giraffe air and 
surface search radar, a Sperry Bridgemaster navigation radar, and a Seastar Safire III fire 
control radar.150  The Independence class littoral combat ships have no installed sonar.151 
The Independence class ships have a BAE Systems 57 millimeter/70 caliber gun 
system, four 12.7-millimeter machine guns, a Raytheon RAM RIM-116 Mk 99 surface-
to-air missile launcher organic to the ship.152  Additional weapons capabilities can be 
added with the addition of mission modules.  The Independence class ships have hangar 
space for a MH-60 R/S helicopter and three vertical takeoff UAVs.153 
3. Modules 
The LCS is designed to be modular.  Essential to the modular concept of the LCS 
are the modules that provide the enhanced capabilities in the form of three unique 
mission packages (MP). The three modules are the SUW module, the ASW module, and 
the MCM module.154  Each of these mission modules is designed to fit within the 
                                                







154 “Freedom Class Littoral Combat Ship Flight 0,” IHS Jane’s, July 25, 2012; “Independence Class 
Littoral Combat Ship Flight 0,” IHS Jane’s, July 25, 2012. 
 38 
standard 10 and 20 foot containers to ease the transport and storage of the modules.155  
The LCS MP concept is a three-tiered approach to capabilities and equipment.  The first 
layer is the mission system (MS).  The MS is composed of the various vehicles, weapons, 
and additional sensors that give the ships the additional capabilities.  The next level, the 
mission modules (MM), consists of the MS with the addition of the various pieces of 
support equipment needed to operate the MS on the LCS.  The final layer, the MP, 
consists of the MM, the assigned personnel, and the aviation assets.156 
a. SUW Module 
The SUW MP is designed to give the LCS the ability to combat the small 
boat threat.  The first component of the SUW MP is the surface-to-surface MM, which 
consists of the surface-to-surface missile MS.  The surface-to-surface MS consists of the 
missiles, launchers, and the control systems associated with the targeting and launch of 
the missiles.157  The intended mission, a joint Army-Navy program called the Non-Line 
of Sight Launch System (NLOS-LS), was canceled and replaced by the AGM-176 Griffin 
missile already in use with the Army and Air Force.158  The second component, the Gun 
MM, consists of two Mk 44 30-millimeter gun systems and the associated ammunition 
and storage.159  The third MM is Maritime Security MM.  The Maritime Security MM 
consists of two 11-meter rigid hulled inflatable boats, the boarding teams, all their 
required gear, and assorted habitation modules.160  The final MM adds Hellfire missiles 
and 12.7- and 7.62-millimeter machine guns to the helicopter.161 
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b. ASW Module 
The current LCS ASW MP is only partially developed and relies heavily 
on deployable manned and unmanned systems.  It was determined to be inadequate for 
the ASW mission and a second generation MP has been proposed.162  The second 
generation ASW MP consists of the ASW escort module, the torpedo defense module, 
the aviation module, and the mission management center.163  The ASW escort MM will 
consist of a variable depth sonar (VDS), a multi-function towed array (MFTA), the 
launching and recovery equipment for both sonar systems, and the signal processing 
systems.164  The torpedo defense MM will consist of the MFTA with acoustic intercept 
capabilities to detect incoming torpedoes and the lightweight towed torpedo 
countermeasure system.165  The Aviation MM will consist of the MH-60R helicopter 
with the airborne low frequency sonar system and two UAVs.166  The second generation 
ASW MP is expected to enter service in 2016.167  
c. MCM Module 
The LCS MCM MP is still under development but is designed around 
multiple manned and unmanned systems that would allow the LCS to find and neutralize 
mines while remaining outside the minefield.168  The MP currently consists of advanced 
airborne detection and neutralization equipment.  The MH-60S helicopter will tow the 
AQS-20A minehunting sonar, the AN/WLD-1 remote multi-mission vehicle, or the 
Airborne Laser Mine Detection System (ALMDS).  Mines will be destroyed using the 
helicopter deployed Rapid Airborne Mine Clearance System or the Airborne Mine 
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Neutralization System.  For mine sweeping operations, the MH-60S is equipped with the 
Organic Airborne and Surface Influence Sweep.169 
C. CONCLUSION 
The primary HD platform of the U.S. Navy, the OHP frigate, is being 
decommissioned due to age and is supposed to be replaced by the LCS.  The LCS is 
designed to provide the U.S. Navy with the ability to conduct a variety of HD mission 
and traditional military missions, including the ability to conduct maritime security 
operations with the SUW module, conduct shallow water ASW with the ASW module, 
and mine clearance operations with the MCM module.  The questions are whether it is 
the right ship for the mission and whether it can be procured efficiently within the current 
budget-constrained environment. The next chapter examines these issues. 
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V. CRITIQUES OF CURRENT PLANS 
This chapter summarizes the various critiques of U.S. Navy plans for the future of 
the fleet, both in terms of fleet composition and the LCS.  The fleet has remained almost 
unchanged in design since the Second World War.  That fleet was designed to conduct 
major fleet operations against a similarly arranged combatant and to conduct amphibious 
operations.  But the evolving modern security environment has changed the requirements 
for the fleet.  This chapter then examines the LCS program and the many challenges and 
problems associated with its development and operations. 
A. FLEET COMPOSITION 
Since the end of the Cold War, there have been a number of studies conducted 
concerning the ideal composition of the fleet.  The composition of the U.S. fleet has 
remained relatively unchanged since the Second World War.  The U.S. fleet has been 
designed to project power, provide deterrence, and control the seas through the use of 
aircraft carriers, nuclear submarines, and amphibious operations.  The current fleet is 
capable of handling the types of missions that are associated with HD – maritime 
engagement, counter-narcotics, counter-piracy, and maritime security.  But the design is 
inefficient for the task.  The fleet is built around billion dollar air defense and anti-
submarine platforms that are being required to work at the low end of the spectrum of 
operations, rather than in their primary warfare area. 
In 2004, Congress ordered that the Navy conduct a study as to the future of the 
Navy’s fleet.  In 2005, the results of three independent studies were reported to Congress.  
Conducted by the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA), the Center for Strategic and 
Budgetary Analysis (CSBA), and the DoD Office of Force Transformation (OFT), each 
of these three potential fleet architectures propose a departure from the present fleet, 
though the degree to which they differ is radically different.  The CNA is a federally 
funded research organization that works on behalf of the Navy.  The CNA report is the 
most conservative of the three; it essentially supports the existing plan for the growth of 
the U.S. fleet.  The CSBA report imagines a fleet slightly more radical than the CNA 
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report.  The CSBA fleet utilizes a very similar architecture to the existing fleet with only 
a few additional platforms to fill the gaps.  Unlike the CNA and the CSBA, the OFT was 
part of the DoD until it was disestablished in 2006.  Headed by one of the biggest 
proponents for radical transformation in the fleet, retired Admiral Arthur Cebrowski, the 
OFT report imagines a radically different fleet composition that is designed to conduct 
operations across the entire spectrum of conflict in the 21st Century.170 
1. CNA Report 
The most conservative model of an alternative fleet architecture, the CNA model, 
serves to justify the current composition of the fleet and the current plans for fleet 
modernization.  Analyzed using the preexisting DoD models and approaches, the CNA 
report proposes a fleet with a design very similar to the Navy fleet at the time.  The fleet 
is still centered on the traditional CSG and ESG units with the addition of the LCS to fill 
the low-end combatant gap.171  The only revolutionary concept with this study is that it 
serves to justify either fleet expansion or fleet reduction.172 
2. CSBA Report 
The CSBA report falls between the CNA report and the OFA report.  It is more 
conservative than the first but also suggests some modification of the structure of the 
current fleet, as does the OFT report.  The majority of the fleet suggested in this report is 
unchanged from what presently exists. Unlike the OFT report’s complete redesign of the 
fleet, the CSBA report only suggests the production of multiple classes of aircraft 
carriers. The fleet would be designed around both large and medium-deck aircraft 
carriers, amphibious ships, cruisers, destroyers, and the LCS.173  The combination of both 
large and medium-sized aircraft carriers allows the fleet to provide more global coverage 
with similar levels of manning.  
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3. OFT Report 
The OFT report recommends the most radical departure from the existing fleet.  
This report recommends the creation of eight new classes of ships and then reorganizes 
the fleet around them.  First of all, this report recommends the building of two different 
types of aircraft carriers.  One aircraft carrier would displace about half as much as a 
current CVN and the other would displace roughly equivalent to an eighth of a current 
CVN.  In addition to both types of aircraft carriers, the report imagines a large, 
amphibious warship capable of both operating aircraft and launching amphibious 
assaults.  This report also suggested the construction of a number of different types of 
combatants, a large missile ship, a 1000-ton surface shop, and a 100-ton surface ship.  
The missile ship would be a large surface combatant (approximately the same size as the 
suggested amphibious ship), armed with 360 VLS tubes, and be able to operate as a 
support ship for the smaller combatants.  The small combatants would have a 
combination of both organic and modular capabilities, allowing them to be tailored for 
specific operations as needed.  Finally, the OFT fleet could include support ships for the 
small combatants and non-nuclear submarines to support the traditional national defense 
mission and HD.174 
The strength of the fleet designed in the OFT report is in numbers and advanced 
capabilities.  By shrinking the size and complexity of the ships that make up the fleet, the 
same cost and manning can be spread out over more ships.  Using a similar CSG and 
ESG arrangement as the fleet currently uses, the OFT report provides three alternative 
fleets, all of which at least double the current fleet numbers.175  In order to achieve the 
sorts of capabilities with the more ships, the OFT report advocates smaller ships with 
improved payloads, network-centric warfare capabilities, and modularity.176 
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B.  LCS 
Since its inception, the LCS program has faced much criticism.  Initially, the 
program faced stiff opposition for its departure from traditional ship design and as the 
program developed with two different hulls built, the program’s problems became more 
than just conceptual.  Critics of the program cite the extensive cost of the program, the 
apparent lack of survivability of the platforms, manning and problems with the modules 
as reasons to reevaluate the Navy’s plan.   
1. Cost 
The most serious problem associated with the LCS program is the cost of the 
project.  When the program was first imagined, the cost of each LCS was estimated at 
$220 million.177  But as time progressed and the programs developed, the cost of each 
LCS steadily expanded.  Between 2005 and 2007, the cost estimate for the LCS-1 grew 
from $215.5 million in 2005 to $274.5 million in 2007.  In that same amount of time, the 
cost of LCS-2 expanded from $213.7 million to $278.1 million.  In both cases, the cost of 
each version of the LCS grew almost 30 percent in a two-year period.   According to the 
Navy, the growth during this period was a result that the initial cost estimates of the LCS 
did not include many of the traditional costs associated with a Navy shipbuilding 
program, such as program management costs, inflation, and project growth.178  By 2008, 
the cost of the LCS-1 variant had ballooned to an estimated $370 million and the 
estimated cost of both LCS programs had expanded to somewhere near $1.075 billion.  In 
2009, the program costs continued to rise.  LCS-1 was estimated to cost $531 million and 
LCS-2 was estimated at $507 million.  The FY2011 Budget continued to show the 
expansion of the LCS program.  By 2011, the costs of the LCS-1 had somewhat steadied 
out at $537 million, but the cost of LCS-2 had ballooned to $575 million. By 2012, the 
cost of each LCS had steadied at $537 million for LCS-1 and $653 million for LCS-2, not 
including the final delivery costs associated with each ship.  Both cost estimates do not 
include the expected final outfitting, post-delivery, and the Final System Design Mission 
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Systems and Ship Integration Team costs for each vessel, which add an additional $150 
million to the final cost of each ship, raising the total cost of each ship to $670.4 million 
for the LCS-1 and $808.8 million for LCS-2.179  In October 2012, Rear Admiral John 
Kirby, the U.S. Navy’s Chief of Information, responded to the many criticisms of the 
increasing LCS program cost.  According to him, though the initial costs of the program 
are high, the fixed price contract of the 20 LCS program ships will eventually result in 
cost savings.  By the time the tenth LCS is under construction, the average cost of the 
LCS should be under the $400 million price cap set by Congress.180  Even though the 
cost of each LCS is supposed to drop as more of them are built, it is unlikely that the LCS 
program will ever represent the sort of cost savings imaged. 
Many have tried to justify the near tripling of the cost of an LCS over a seven-
year period.  One possibility is that the initial estimates for both versions of the LCS were 
intentionally and unreasonably low in order to ensure that the Navy and the DoD commit 
to the program before the true costs of the program became known.  But there is no 
evidence to support this claim.181  Another possibility for the increase in the cost is that 
the application of the Naval Vessel Rules (NVR) to the LCS program resulted in 
significant delays and redesigns which caused the cost to increase.  The NVR are a series 
of rules and regulations put in place by the American Bureau of Shipping and the Naval 
Sea Systems Command that govern the stability, structural design, propulsion plant, 
electrical systems, navigation systems, communication systems, and habitability of a 
naval ship.  The Navy argues that being required to meet NVR requirements drove up the 
price of the LCS program and because the NVR was issued while both versions of the 
LCS were under construction, the Navy and the builders of the LCS were forced to 
constantly adjust the designs, which drove up prices.182  Finally, the Navy also attributes 
some of the price increases to poor shipyard performance and the increased cost of 
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building materials during construction.183  But based on the studies conducted concerning 
the cost growth of warships, price growth due to increased building materials and 
shipyard costs is unlikely.  The most likely reason for the incredible growth of the price 
of an LCS is some combination of all three factors.  In the end, the Navy ended up with a 
ship capable of conducting low-end operations but built for the price of a modern multi-
mission frigate. 
2. Vulnerability 
One of the biggest criticisms of the LCS is that the ships are not expected to be 
survivable.  In 1988, the U.S. Navy published OPNAVISNT 9070.1, Survivability Policy 
for Surface Ships of the U.S. Navy.  This document assigned three different levels of 
survivability to ships with respect to how much damage in battle ships built to those 
standards would be able withstand.  The first of these levels, Level I, provided the least 
amount of protection to both ship and crew.  The only combatants that were designed to 
this level of survivability were the patrol craft and minesweepers.184 
Level I represents the least severe environment anticipated and excludes 
the need for enhanced survivability for designated ship classes to sustain 
operations in the immediate area of an engaged Battle Group or in the 
general war-at-sea region. In this category, the minimum design capability 
required shall, in addition to the inherent sea keeping mission, provide for 
EMP and shock hardening, individual protection for CBR, including 
decontamination stations, the DC/FF capability to control and recover 
from conflagrations and include the ability to operate in a high latitude 
environment.185  
The second of these levels, Level II, provided more protection to ships designed 
to operate in conjunction with a CSG or ESG.  Ships designed to this level were supposed 
to be able to take some weapons damage and continue combat operations for a time.  
Most of the ships in the Navy are currently constructed to this level.  Specifically, 
frigates, amphibious ships and logistic ships are built to this level.186  
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Level II represents an increase of severity to include the ability for 
sustained operations when in support of a Battle Group and in the general 
war-at-sea area. This level shall provide the ability for sustained combat 
operations following weapons impact. Capabilities shall include the 
requirements of Level I plus primary and support system redundancy, 
collective protection system, improved structural integrity and 
subdivision, fragmentation protection, signature reduction, conventional 
and nuclear blast protection and nuclear hardening.187 
The third and final level of survivability, Level III, provided the greatest 
protection to the ship and crew and allowed ships to be hit by multiple anti-ship missiles 
or torpedoes and continue operations.  The only ships in the fleet that were designed to 
this level were the aircraft carriers, cruisers, and destroyers.188 “Level III, the most severe 
environment projected for combatant Battle Groups, shall include the requirements of 
Level II plus the ability to deal with the broad degrading effects of damage from anti-ship 
cruise missiles (ASCM), torpedoes and mines.”189 
In late 2012, the Navy issued a new version of this instruction, 9070.1A.  This 
instruction got rid of the traditional levels of survivability and replaced it with a more 
pragmatic approach.  Survivability would no longer be broken down into distinct 
categories but be determined by the capabilities of the ships, rather than their 
characteristics and construction.  According to the most recent instruction, survivability is 
now based on:  
This basic premise has not changed although survivability is now 
considered in terms of capabilities vice characteristics. The previous 
version established a minimum baseline of survivability. This revision 
recognizes the changing nature of naval ship design and system threats 
and eliminates the prescriptive survivability characteristics while 
establishing the new requirement to derive a minimum survivability 
baseline that is based on the programs’ ICD and defined concept of 
operations (CONOPS). Survivability shall be addressed on all new surface 
ship, combat systems and equipment designs, overhauls, conversions, and 
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modernizations in order that the design is provided a balance of 
survivability performance, risk, and cost within program objectives.190 
Initially, the LCS was to be built to what would have been described as Level I.  
The LCS was designed to survive in seas up to 30 feet, have installed firefighting 
systems, be hardened against electromagnetic pulses, and be protected against chemical, 
biological, and radiological attack.  But the LCS was not designed to continue operations 
after taking combat damage.191 Because improving the structural survivability of the LCS 
to Level II would be too expensive, the Navy decided that it was going to create a new 
level of survivability called Level I+.192  Level 1+ places the LCS above a minesweeper 
but less than an OHP frigate in terms of survivability.  Level 1+ protections include all 
the same protections that a Level 1 ship has, but with increased shock mounting for 
mechanical and damage control systems and increased armor around selected spaces.193 
According to the Navy, the reduced survivability of the LCS is made up for in the 
ability of the LCS to travel at much higher speeds compared to normal ships.  With 
expected top speeds above 40 knots, the LCS should be able to run away from any 
warships that could pose a danger.  But this speed comes with a significant cost.  Not 
only do the weight restrictions severely limit the LCS, but the ship’s gun is less effective 
at high speeds, the ship’s range is reduced dramatically, the sonar and minesweeping gear 
become ineffective, and the ship cannot launch or recover the small boats or the 
helicopter.  Most important, the spread of anti-ship missiles around the world negates the 
added value of a ship capable of doing over 40 knots.  With the enemy firing anti-ship 
missiles capable of moving at around 600 knots, the ability of the LCS to travel at 40 
knots becomes moot.194 
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3. Manning 
Another concern with the LCS program is that the reduced manning concept of 
the LCS has a negative impact on readiness and safety.  The LCS was designed to be 
operated by a minimum number of crew in order to cut down on manning costs.  The 
initial estimates for the core crew of a LCS were 40 personnel, with an additional 40 
coming as part of the aviation detachment and MM detachment, which brought the total 
manning of an LCS up to 80.  But even with advanced automation and crew reduction 
measures being used throughout the ship and a the majority of the ships logistical needs 
being managed from units ashore, the workload on the crew was enormous and fatigue 
would greatly reduce the effectiveness of the LCS.195 
In July 2012, the Navy decided to increase the core crew of the LCS by 20 people, 
bringing the total crew of the ship up to 100.  In addition, the LCS will deploy with a 
rotational crew concept, similar to what is used on the Fleet Ballistic Missile Submarines.  
The Navy intends to man each LCS using a three crew for every two LCS model.  The 
ships will remain forward deployed for 16 months at a time and the individual crews will 
deploy out to the ships on four month cycles.  The theory behind this plan is that it will 
allow the LCS to remain deploy for longer periods of time than traditional manning 
models allow.196 
But even with the increased crew size and decreased deployment time, fatigue 
will still set in quicker on the LCS than on a traditional ship and reduce the safety and 
readiness of the personnel on the ship.  The reduced manning leads to more time spent on 
watch both in port and underway.  This translates into less time available to perform 
maintenance and upkeep on the ships.  Combined with the legal prohibition against 
foreign workers performing certain types of essential maintenance on U.S. warships, the 
material condition of the LCS will continuously decline.197 
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Without the correct module installed, the LCS has only a limited offensive 
capability.  In an ideal situation, an LCS would deploy with one module installed and 
operate in that role until a new situation developed that would require the LCS to rush 
back to port, switch out the old module and replace it with the correct one in 24 hours and 
proceed on its new mission with a new set of abilities.  But in reality this concept, seems 
to not work as designed and only offers limited benefits.  Countries, such as Denmark, 
have used modular weapon systems and capabilities on their ships successfully, but never 
to such an extent that the ship must have no modules to perform its several tasks.  
During the initial war-gaming for the LCS, a number of issues were identified 
concerning the modular design.  One of the biggest problems is that the support 
infrastructure needed to change out the modules is often not available in the types of 
austere ports out of which the LCS is expected to operate.  Ports in these regions are often 
small and not equipped to support a U.S. Navy presence in them.  Additionally, in these 
same war games, the opposing forces were able to severely hamper the usefulness of the 
LCS by targeting the facilities needed to change out the modules.  Without the ability to 
switch modules, the effectiveness of the LCS in combat operations was greatly 
reduced.198  Another problem exposed during the games was that the time needed to 
switch out the modules began limiting the usefulness of the LCS.  The original concept 
was based on a 24-hour change out cycle.  But as the modules became more complex and 
the concept became more developed, the time needed to change a module grew.  An 
optimistic current estimate for the time needed is 96 hours but in actuality it is expected 
to take even longer, especially when operating overseas from an austere port.  But with 
very few complete modules, the actual time needed to change out a module in a foreign 
port is only an estimate.199 
There are other problems pending.  The two main components of the MCM 
module do not work as previously thought.  A 2011 report by the DoD Operational Test 
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and Evaluation Office identified some of them.  The report found that both the AN/AQS-
20A Sonar Mine Detecting Set and the ALMDS are “deficient” in their primary role.200  
The ALMDS is unable to detect mines while operating at its maximum depth and is 
unable to classify mines while operating at surface depths.201  The SUW module has 
experienced similar problems to the MCM module.  Initially, the SUW was supposed to 
come equipped with a joint Navy and Army missile system known NLOS-LS.  This 
missile was designed to give the LCS a missile capable of targeting enemies at a range of 
25 nautical miles.  When this program was canceled in 2011, the NLOS-LS was replaced 
with the Griffin missile.202  Without the NLOS-LS, the LCS SUW module is limited to a 
3.5 nautical miles offensive capability.203 
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VI. ALTERNATE SOLUTIONS 
The existing composition of the U.S. fleet is well designed to handle the 
traditional power projection role of the national strategy and the role of the LCS is 
supposed to fill the low-intensity gaps that the modern fleet inefficiently handles.  But 
both the LCS and the current fleet architecture are not the right answer for the types of 
homeland defense missions that the Navy finds itself operating in.  
The current force structure of the U.S. Navy leaves a significant gap in the fleet.  
The current fleet leaves the Navy adequately prepared to handle strategic deterrent, 
unopposed power projection, and sea control, but too few ships for forward presence.  
The increasing number of nontraditional missions that the U.S. Navy finds itself engaged 
in require more and different ships.  Most importantly, the Navy needs to ensure that 
these ships are able to handle the variety of modern missions that fall outside the 
traditional scope of naval operations, yet still can play a role in traditional fleet operations 
when needed.  Frigate and corvette-sized ships have been the mainstay of small, modern 
navies around the world since the end of the Second World War.  Ships of these two 
classes are able to provide many of the capabilities of larger ships, but at a more 
reasonable price and with smaller manning requirements.  Additionally, frigates and 
corvettes are ideally suited for the HD mission.  They have the long operational range and 
endurance needed to conduct counter-piracy operations and counter-narcotics patrols in 
remote waters.  The weapons and sensor systems are more suited for the low to medium 
intensity conflict areas where maritime security and engagement missions occur.  And 
their small size and shallow draft lets them operate close to shore and in underdeveloped 
ports.  They are better suited to conduct training with partner-nations without 
overwhelming them with capabilities and technologies that are beyond the scope of what 
is needed. 
Corvettes are generally well-suited for these roles.  Corvettes displace between 
500 tons and 2500 tons and are normally armed with a small- to medium-caliber gun, 
limited surface-to-surface missiles, and four to eight surface-to-air missiles. Corvettes 
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tend to have decent anti-submarine warfare capabilities, especially in shallow waters.204  
Corvettes were traditionally assigned coastal patrol missions, but in modern navies, the 
corvette excels at protection of maritime infrastructure, counter-narcotics patrols, and 
counter-piracy.  
Slightly larger than corvettes, frigates traditionally displace between 2500 tons 
and 4000 tons.  Like corvettes, frigates are normally armed with small- to medium-
caliber guns, surface-to-air missiles, surface-to-surface missiles, but are often afforded a 
more robust strike or air-defense capacity due to their larger size.  Traditionally, frigates 
were used to provide open ocean escort to convoys and conduct anti-submarine 
operations.  Since the end of the Cold War, frigates have proven themselves to excel in a 
variety of non-traditional missions, while still maintaining their ability to locate and 
destroy submarines.  Additionally, many nations with extended maritime claims rely on 
the long endurance provide by frigates to conduct patrols throughout their waters in 
support of the counter-narcotic, counter-proliferation, counter-smuggling, and counter-
immigration missions away from normal logistical support.  High sprint speeds of 40 to 
45 knots is not thought to be cost effective for either class of vessel. 
Both corvettes and frigates provide the unique blend of low cost and low 
manning, with the multiple capabilities needed in the modern threat environment and in 
support of the homeland defense mission.  The U.S. Navy is in need of a true modern 
frigate or corvette type ship and there are three options available: the corvette, a modular 
frigate, or a true patrol frigate. 
A. ALTERNATE FORCE STRUCTURE 
There has been little written about the effect that force structure has on the U.S. 
Navy operations and how that relates to the ability of the Navy to conduct operations 
across the entire spectrum.   In 2009, Captain Hughes suggested a radical departure from 
any previously existing fleet organization in his team’s study entitled The New Navy 
Fighting Machine.  In this study, he suggests that the U.S. Navy needs to radically 
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redesign the fleet around existing and hypothetical ship designs in order to reflect the 
changing international maritime security environment.  Instead of the 300-ship Navy of 
the current fleet, the fleet reflected in this study would be over 600 ships with the 
majority of them being designed for combat in the littoral regions for the same cost.  
What would make this fleet unique is that it was designed to maintain the present levels 
of shipbuilding funding and manning requirements.205  The small surface combatants in 
this fleet would be divided between what Hughes calls the “Forces for Theater Security 
and Coastal Combat Operations” and the “Surface Combatants.”  But for the sake of 
simplicity, they will be described as the Green Water Fleet and the Blue Water Fleet. 
The Green Water Fleet was designed to give the U.S. Navy maximum operational 
flexibility in the littoral environment.  To do this, the first level of the fleet was designed 
to provide both security and training to partner-nation navies in order to develop their 
capabilities.  To do this, the Navy would maintain a fleet of approximately 400 inshore 
patrol craft.206  These patrol craft would be used to provide maritime security and 
conduct counter-piracy and counter-narcotics patrols in the littoral regions and provide 
training to local navies.  At the end of their five-year service life in the U.S. Navy, 
Hughes suggests giving these ships directly to the partner-nations.  The next tier up from 
the inshore patrol craft would be the offshore patrol craft.  These ships would have a 
similar mission to the inshore patrol boats but provide coverage farther out from shore. 
They would remain in U.S. service for their entire life span.207  Finally, the Green Water 
Fleet would be rounded out with Streetfighter-like fast attack ships to provide a 
significant offensive capability in the littorals.  In support of these three layers of ships 
would be a number of logistical and maintenance support ships, gunfire support ships, 
mine clearance ships, and light aircraft carriers, similar to the existing LHA and LHD 
designs.208   
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The Blue Water Fleet would remain relatively similar to what currently exists, but 
would be altered to reflect the current realities of maritime combat.  Hughes recommends 
keeping the current nuclear powered aircraft carriers, but gradually reducing their 
numbers to six.  The reduced number of large aircraft carriers would be augmented with 
the construction of about ten smaller aircraft carriers for helicopters and short take off 
jets.209  Strike capability in this fleet would be maintained with a number of land attack 
ships, which are armed with nothing but cruise missiles, with a design similar to the 
Arsenal ship but carrying 50 cruise missiles, instead of 500.  The destroyer would 
continue to play the role of the air-defense ship, but the anti-surface and anti-submarine 
missions would be taken over by a new class of frigates.210 
The fleet imaged in The New Navy Fighting Machine would be uniquely capable 
for conducting operations in support of HD.  The ships of both the Green Water Fleet and 
the Blue Water Fleet would be able to conduct operations across the entire spectrum of 
HD missions.  The patrol boats and offshore patrol ships would be ideal for the counter-
piracy and counter-narcotics mission.  And because the patrol boats are designed to be 
given to the partner-nations after five years, they are ideal to use for maritime security 
capacity building.  The offshore patrol boats of the Green Water Fleet and the multi-
mission frigates of the Blue Water Fleet would be ideal for conducting operations across 
the entire spectrum HD missions and should be pursued for procurement by the U.S. 
Navy.  And because these ships cost much less and require less manning than the LCS 
and the Arleigh Burke destroyers that make up fleet, they can be procured at a greater rate 
and increase the number of ships in the fleet.  A number of ships around the world exist 
that would fit the description of the offshore patrol ship or the multi-mission frigate. 
B. ALTERNATE SHIP TYPES 
1. Corvette 
The smallest option for the U.S. Navy would be the construction of a class of 
corvettes that could be used in the offshore patrol boat role suggested in The New Navy 
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Fighting Machine.  The Streetfighter concept called for the construction of a class of 
small, high-speed vessels that would be armed with surface-to-surface missiles, anti-ship 
missiles, and machine guns designed to operate in the crowded and shallow littoral 
regions and these vessels would be similar to that concept.  Vessels of this type are 
somewhat larger than a fast attack boat, with a displacement between 500 to 1000 tons 
and a crew approximately 50 people but retain the high-speed capability of the fast attack 
boats.  These ships are able to operate independently or in squadrons of a four to eight 
ships each.  Their small size allows for high speed and rapid maneuvering, but at the 
expense of endurance.  
Both the Swedish and Israeli navies have found a place for corvette-sized ships in 
their fleets.  Ideally suited for littoral combat and homeland defense, both the Swedish 
Visby class and the Israeli Eilat (Sa’ar 5) classes provide significant offensive capacity 
for a minimal cost.  Both the Visby and the Eilat corvettes provide both the small size and 
stealth characteristics of the LCS.  But unlike the LCS, both corvettes maintain their 
ability to provide a strong surface and subsurface attack and still operate freely in the 
littoral region.  The Eilat (Sa’ar 5) is an ideal candidate for purchase by the U.S. Navy.  It 
is designed and built by an American shipyard and equipped mostly with proven 
technologies that are already in the U.S. inventory, which would keep the costs down.   
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a. Visby class 
 
Figure 4.  HMS Helsingborg (K32) (From IHS Jane’s, 2011) 
The Visby class was first designed during the final years of the Cold War 
and entered the Swedish fleet in the 1990s as part of a modernization program for the 
Swedish Navy.  Intended to fight in the littoral regions of the Swedish coast and the 
Baltic Sea, the Visby class is designed to handle a variety of missions.  Built for less than 
$200 million, these ships are able to conduct sea control, antisubmarine warfare, mine 
countermeasures, mine laying, air defense, surveillance, patrol, escort, search and rescue, 
and civilian support operations.211 
The Visby class corvettes have a length of 240 feet, a beam of 34 feet, a 
draft of 7.9 feet and displace approximately 630 tons.212  The Visby class vessels are 
constructed with stealth in mind.  The hull is constructed of a non-magnetic carbon fiber 
composite surrounding a foam core.  This unique composition allows for the vessels to 
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have a minimum radar signature, a low infrared signature, and a low magnetic signature, 
while being strong enough to handle the stresses of high speed maneuvering.213  Visby’s 
are powered by a Combined Diesel or Gas (CODOG) system consisting of four TF 50A 
gas turbine engines and two MTU 16V 2000 N90 diesel engines.  These engines can be 
alternately used to power the ship’s two SII KaMeWa waterjets.  Additionally, a HRP 
200-65 Holland Roer Propeller bow thruster assists slow speed maneuvering.214  The 
ships can transit at 15 knots for 2500nm using only the diesel engines or sprint up to 35 
knots using the four turbines.215  The Visby class corvettes have a crew of 10 officers and 
43 enlisted personnel.216 
The Visby class are equipped with the Ericsson Sea Giraffe AMB 3D air 
and surface search radar, a Terma Scanter 2001 surface search radar, and a CEROS 200 
Mk 3 fire control radar.217  For subsurface search, the Visby class employs a General 
Dynamics Hydra Suite with a bow mounted high frequency system with a Hydroscience 
passive towed array and VDS.218  In addition, the Visby can also carry a Double-Eagle 
Mk III remote controlled underwater vehicle (ROV) for mine identification and detection 
and an expendable Atlas Elektronik Seafox ROV-E for mine destruction. 
The Visby class is armed with a Bofors 57mm 70 SAK Mk III general-
purpose gun to engage air, surface, and missile threats.  The Visby class is equipped with 
four 400-millimeter torpedo tubes, capable of firing the Type 45 
antisubmarine/antisurface torpedoes.  Though not currently equipped, the Visby class 
ships have space allocated for the installation a surface to air missile battery.219  In place 
of the mine countermeasure system, the Visby class can equip eight Saab RBS 15 Mk II 
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surface-to-surface missiles.220  The Visby is capable of laying mines.221  The Visby has 
the facilities for one Agusta Bell A109 helicopter.222 
b. Eilat (Sa’ar 5) class  
 
Figure 5.  INS Hanit (503) (From IHS Jane’s, 2012) 
In the early 1990s, the Israeli Navy contracted the construction of a class 
of corvettes to replace their aging missile boats.  Northrop Grumman constructed three 
corvettes at the Litton Ingalls shipyard in Pascagoula, Mississippi at a cost of $260 
million each.223  The Eilat (Sa’ar 5) class corvettes have a length of 279 feet, a beam of 
39 feet, a draft of 10.5 feet, and displace 1092 tons.224 A single LM2500 gas turbine 
engine and two MTU 12V TB82 diesel engines in a CODOG arrangement power the 
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ships of this class.  The Eilat class corvettes have a maximum speed of 33 knots in the 
gas turbine configuration and a maximum speed of 22 knots in the diesel configuration.  
The ships have a range of 3500 nautical miles at a speed of 17 knots.225 The Eilat 
corvettes are crewed by 20 officers and 74 enlisted personnel.  The Eilat corvettes have a 
maximum endurance of 20 days.226 
The Eilat corvettes are equipped with Elta EL/M-2218S air search radar, a 
Cardion SPS-55 surface search radar, and three Elta EL/M-2221 SM STGR fire control 
radars.227 For subsurface search, the Eilat corvettes are equipped with a EDO Type 796 
Mod 1 hull-mounted sonar system.228 
Each Eilat corvette is equipped with either a 76 millimeter/62 caliber OTO 
Melara main gun, a 57 millimeter Bofors cannon, or a 20 millimeter Sea Vulcan.229 The 
Eilat corvettes also are equipped with a number of missiles.  Each vessel is armed with 
eight Harpoon missile canisters to attack surface vessels and two 32-cell vertical launch 
systems for the Israeli Industries Barak I surface-to-air missile.230  In addition, each ship 
is armed with six Mk 32 324 millimeter torpedo tubes, capable of firing the Mk 46 
torpedo.231  The Eilat class corvettes have facilities for operating one Dauphin SA 366G 
or Sea Panther helicopter.232 










c. Braunschweig (K130) class 
 
Figure 6.  FGS Magdeburg (F-261) (From IHS Jane’s, 2012) 
Constructed by the German shipbuilding company Blohm + Voss, the 
Braunschweig (K130) class are part of the MEKO family of warships.  Designed to be 
modular, MEKO type vessels allow for the vessels to be constructed cheaply with a high 
degree of customization for the buyer.233  These ships are not modular in the sense that 
the LCS is.  They are modular in that they are constructed off of a common frame that 
allows the purchaser of the ship to insert the ideal sensors and weapons systems during 
construction for their intended missions.  This class of ships is designed to provide the 
German Navy with a modern means of surface surveillance, antisurface warfare, 
humanitarian assistance, and littoral combat at a minimum cost.234 
The Braunschweig class corvettes have a length of 291 feet, a beam of 43 
feet, a draft of 16 feet, and displace 1870 tons.235  The hull and superstructure of the 
Braunschweig class are designed specifically to reduce the ship’s radar cross section.  
The ships were also designed with multiple measures to reduce ship’s infrared 
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signature.236  The Braunschweig are powered by two MTU diesel engines, capable of 
propelling the ships to a maximum speed of 26 knots.  Bow thrusters are added for 
additional slow speed maneuvering.  The maximum range of the K130 corvettes is 2500 
nautical miles at a speed of 15 knots.237  The K130 class is manned by a crew of 8 
officers and 58 enlisted personnel.238  The K130 class corvettes are able to remain at sea 
for 7 days unsupported and for 21 days with the support of a tender vessel.239 
The K130 corvettes are equipped with the EADS TRS-3D air and surface 
search and fire control radar and two Raymarine Pathfinder navigation radars.240  The 
K130 are armed with a single OTO Melara 76 millimeter/62 caliber Compact gun and 
two Mauser 27 millimeter cannons are mounted amidships.241  The K130 class corvettes 
are also armed with four Saab RBS-15 Mk3 anti-ship missiles and two Raytheon RIM-
116 Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM) batteries.242  The K130 class corvettes have 
faculties to operate one medium helicopter as well as enough additional space for two 
UAV.243 
2. Modular Frigate 
The next option for the U.S. Navy is the development of a modular frigate.  The 
capabilities of the LCS are limited to only the module that is installed on the ship.  The 
LCS has no organic air defense capabilities and no installed sonar, which severely limits 
the ability of the LCS to operate in a constantly evolving battlespace.  A modular frigate 
retains the traditional capabilities of a frigate, but can be augmented with increased anti-
                                                
236 Blohm + Voss Naval, “Corvette Class 130,” accessed February 10, 2013, https://www.blohmvoss-
naval.com/en/corvette-class-130.html. 
237 Blohm + Voss Naval, “Corvette Class 130,” accessed February 10, 2013, https://www.blohmvoss-
naval.com/en/corvette-class-130.html; “Braunschweig (K130) class (FSGHM),” IHS Jane’s, March 2, 
2012. 
238 “Braunschweig (K130) class (FSGHM),” IHS Jane’s, March 2, 2012. 
239 “Korvette, Braunschweig"-Klasse (K 130), accessed February 10, 2013, 
http://www.marine.de/portal/a/marine/!ut/p/c4/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP3I5EyrpHK93MQivfL
EtLTUvNI8vez8orLUkpJUvaSixNK84uSM8tTMdP2CbEdFAOmFiNM!/#par2. 
240 Blohm + Voss Naval, “Corvette Class 130,” accessed February 10, 2013, https://www.blohmvoss-
naval.com/en/corvette-class-130.html; “Braunschweig (K130) class (FSGHM),” IHS Jane’s, March 2, 
2012. 
241 Blohm + Voss Naval, “Corvette Class 130,” https://www.blohmvoss-naval.com/en/corvette-class-
130.html, accessed 10 February 2013; “Braunschweig (K130) class (FSGHM),” IHS Jane’s, March 2, 
2012. 
242 Blohm + Voss Naval, “Corvette Class 130,” accessed February 10, 2013, https://www.blohmvoss-
naval.com/en/corvette-class-130.html; “Braunschweig (K130) class (FSGHM),” IHS Jane’s, March 2, 
2012. 
243 Blohm + Voss Naval, “Corvette Class 130,” accessed February 10, 2013, https://www.blohmvoss-
naval.com/en/corvette-class-130.html. 
 64 
ship, anti-aircraft, or strike capabilities as needed.   The larger size of these vessels means 
that they are not as fast as a corvette, but also translates into a longer operational 
endurance, providing for a longer time on station, which can be essential when operating 
in remote regions. 
The Absalon class frigates combine the best aspects of a frigate with the best 
aspects of a modular ship.  These ships are fully functional frigates, combined with the 
multipurpose deck and loading ramp of an amphibious assault ship and the functionality 
and ease of modification of a modular ship.  This combination of capabilities would make 
a ship similar to the Absalon class ideal for conduction HA/DR, engagement, and 
maritime security operations. 
a. Absalon class  
 
Figure 7.  HDMS Absalon (L16) (From IHS Jane’s, 2012) 
The Absalon class of the Royal Dutch Navy is unique in that these ships 
are truly multi-mission platforms.  Each ship has five Stanflex container positions for 
modular weapons systems and a Roll On/Roll off ramp, which allows access to an 
additional 900 square meters of multipurpose deck space.  This space is capable of 
storing vehicles up to the size of a main battle tank, or up to 34 twenty-foot equivalent 
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units of supplies or ammunition.244  This deck can be converted into a command center 
or hospital with the installation of berthing modules.245 
The Absalon class ships have a length of 450 feet, a beam of 64 feet, a 
draft of 21 feet, and displace 6400 tons.246  Four MTU 8000 M70 diesel engines power 
the Absalon class support in a Combined Diesel and Diesel (CODAD) arrangement, with 
arranged with two engines per shaft.247  The Absalon class support ships are equipped 
with bow thrusters for assistance in slow speed maneuvering.248  The Absalon class ships 
have a range of 11500 nautical miles at 14 knots.249  The Absalon class ships have a crew 
of 99 personnel but with the installation of berthing modules, can support 200 additional 
personnel.250 
The Absalon class ships are equipped with a Thales SMART-S 3D 
combined air and surface search radar, a Terma Scanter 2001 surface search and 
navigation radar, a maximum of 4 SaabTech Ceros 200 Mk3, and a Furuno FR-2117 
navigation radar.251  For subsurface search, the Absalon class ships are equipped with an 
Atlas ASO 94 hull mounted sonar.252  For anti-submarine missions, the Absalom class 
can be a modularized towed-array sonar system.253 
The Absalon class vessels are armed with a single 5-inch/62 caliber Mk 45 
Mod 4 gun and two Oerlikon Contraves 35-millimeter GDM08 guns and four 12.7-
                                                













millimeter machine guns.254  In addition, the ships have five modular weapons storage 
areas with the capacity upgrade the Absalon class’s anti-surface or anti-air capabilities.  
These five modules are able to hold a total of sixteen Harpoon Block II anti-ship missiles 
or 36 Evolved Sea Sparrow Missiles (RIM-162B) surface-to-air missiles.255  All Absalon 
class ships are equipped with four 324-millimeter torpedo tubes capable of firing 
Eurotorp Mu 90 Impact torpedoes.  The Absalon class has facilities for operating up to 
two Westland Lynx Mk 90B helicopters.256 
3. Patrol frigate 
The final option of the Navy is the procurement of a traditional patrol frigate.  
Patrol frigates are designed to operate independently and without large amounts of 
logistic support in regions where the threat dictates air defense and antisubmarine 
capabilities are required, but the threat is not high enough to warrant the presence of a 
destroyer.   Patrol frigates are very similar to the traditional anti-air and anti-submarine 
frigates, but are optimized for long range patrols into remote areas without a great deal of 
logistical support. 
A ship very similar to a patrol frigate already exists in the U.S. military.  The 
Coast Guard’s Legend class, also called the National Security Cutter (NSC), would be 
ideal for conversion into a military patrol frigate.  It would not take much to provide this 
ship with the additional weapons and sensor systems needed for it to operate as a frigate 
in support of the HD mission for the Navy.  The ship is already designed and built at an 
American shipyard to 90 percent military construction standards, which would keep the 
costs low.257 
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a. MEKO A-200 SAN class  
 
Figure 8.  SAS Isandlwana (F146) (From IHS Jane’s, 2012) 
Also known as the MEKO A-200 SAN class, the four Valour class frigates 
of the South African Navy were ordered in the late 1990s at a cost of $262 million 
each.258  The Valour frigates have a length of 397 feet, a beam of 54 feet, a draft of 20 
feet, and displace 3648 tons.259  The Valour frigates are powered by a CODAG system 
consisting of a single LM2500 gas turbine engine and two MTU 16V 1163 TB93 diesel 
engines.  The Valour class frigates also have a LiPS LJ210E waterjet located on the 
centerline to assist at slow speed maneuvering.260  The Valour frigates have a maximum 
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speed of 28 knots and a maximum range of 7700 nautical miles at a speed of 15 knots.261  
The Valour frigates have a crew of 20 officers and 100 enlisted.262 
The Valour class frigates are equipped with a Thales MRR air and surface 
search radar, two Reutech RTS 6400 fire control radars, and two Racal Bridgemaster E 
navigation radars.  For subsurface search, the Valour class frigates utilize a hull-mounted 
Thomson Marconi 4132 Kingklip sonar system.263 
Each Valour class frigate is armed with a single Otobreda 76-
millimeter/62 caliber compact gun system, two LIW DPG 35-millimeter guns in a twin 
mount, and two Reutech remote control 12.7-millimeter machine guns.264  The Valour 
class frigates are equipped with eight MBDA Exocent MM 40 Block II anti-ship missiles 
and a Denel Umkhonto 32-cell vertical launch system (VLS) surface-to-air missile 
launcher.265  The Valour class frigates have facilities for two Super Lynx helicopters.266 
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b. Legend class 
 
Figure 9.  USCG Bertholf (WMSL-750) (From IHS Jane’s, 2012) 
The Legend class ships of the U.S. Coast Guard were designed as part of 
the Coast Guard’s Integrated Deepwater System modernization program in 2002.  
Designed as a replacement for the aging Hamilton class, the NSC provide the Coast 
Guard with a ship able to handle all the of Coast Guard’s missions as well as operate in 
conjunction with the U.S. Navy.267  The average cost of the five Legend class ships is 
$684 million dollars each.268 
The Legend class cutters have a length of 418 feet, a beam of 54 feet, a 
draft of 21 feet, and displace 4178 tons at full load.269  The Legend class ships are 
powered by a CODAG system consisting of a single GE LM2500 gas turbine and two 
MTU20V 1163 diesel engines.  For slow speed maneuvering assistance, the Legend class 
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ships are equipped with a bow thruster.270  The maximum range of the Legend class ships 
is 12000 nautical miles at 9 knots and the maximum speed is 28 knots.271  The ships of 
the Legend class are designed to be deployed for 60 to 90 days at a time for up to 230 
days per year.272  The Legend class ships have a crew of 14 officers and 108 enlisted 
personnel.273 
The Legend class ships are equipped with a TRS 3D/16 surface search 
radar, a Hughes-Furuno SPS-73 navigation radar, and a SPQ-9B fire control radar.274  
The Legend class ships are armed with one Bofors 57-millimeter/70 caliber Mk 100 gun 
system, one General Dynamics 20-millimeter Phalanx Mk 15 system, and four 12.7-
millimeter machine guns.275  The Legend class ships have hangar space for one H-65 
helicopter and two UAVs or for two H-65 helicopters.276 
The designer and builder of the NSC have already designed two patrol 
frigate versions of the NSC.  The first of them, designated the PF 4921, utilizes the same 
hull and propulsion system of the NSC but adds increased weapons and sensor 
capabilities.  As designed, the PF 4921 is armed with a 76-millimeter gun, a VLS capable 
of launching short-range antiaircraft missiles, a Phalanx or SeaRAM close-in weapons 
system, eight Harpoon anti-ship missiles, and triple torpedo tubes located on the aft deck.  
The PF 4921 also comes with improved an improved air search compared to the NSC, a 
towed-array sonar, and a hull-mounted sonar system.  The PF 4921 is expected to have a 
range of 8,000 nautical miles and an endurance of 60 days and a crew of 141.  The 
second NSC derivate is the PF 4501.  The PF 4501 is basically identical to the NSC, but 









designed for export, rather than domestic use.  It keeps the same basic sensor and 
weapons systems as the NSC.277 
Though the cost of the PF 4921 project is not known, the ship still is an 
ideal candidate for procurement on the part of the U.S. Navy; ideally the ships will cost 
roughly the same as the LCS.  The additional weapons and sensor systems added to the 
ship already are proven technologies and their use, rather than technologies that are still 
in development, would keep the cost down and prevent the ship from being too 
overwhelming when being used to conduct training and operations with foreign navies. 
C. CONCLUSION 
The patrol frigate and corvette are common ships among the smaller navies 
around the world.  They are inexpensive to build and operate, require smaller crews than 
larger ships, and are still capable of conducting many of the missions that larger, more 
extensively equipped ships can.  The Eilat corvette and PF 4921 version of the NSC 
would make ideal assets for the U.S. Navy, especially for the HD operations.  Both ships 
provide the manning reductions that the LCS is supposed to provide, but still maintain the 
capabilities of a frigate in terms of both traditional and HD missions.  
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The modern U.S. Navy has never before had to contend with of missions that are 
now considered core competencies of the service.  The Navy must efficiently contend 
with adversaries across the spectrum of military operations.  With a number of new 
nations developing carrier aviation and advanced area denial and sea control weapons, it 
is essential that the Navy maintain a structure to retain dominance as the premier force on 
the planet for power projection.  But, at the same time as nations such as China are 
rapidly modernizing their blue water navies to compete against the U.S., the need for 
ships capable of operating in the littoral regions in support of the variety of low to 
medium intensity missions that are part of homeland defense is just as demanding.  The 
U.S. Navy needs to develop a ship that can operate at both ends of the spectrum.  It must 
be able to support operations at the fleet level in support of power projection and sea 
control and be able to operate in support of the HD missions of humanitarian assistance, 
disaster relief and maritime security. 
The HD mission requires numerous ships that are able to operate across the 
spectrum of operations, not just at the lowest level.  The HD mission requires a ship that 
is capable of conducting operations in conjunction with the Coast Guard while 
conducting counter-narcotics patrols in the Caribbean Sea and Pacific Oceans while at the 
same time being able to be deployed to conduct maritime security training and 
engagement missions with nations around the world.  And these same ships must be able 
to operate in conjunction with the rest of the fleet during normal fleet operations. 
The Littoral Combat Ship is the Navy’s attempt to build a ship capable of 
operating among the littoral regions of the world.  The LCS is designed around a concept 
of modularity, allowing mission modules to be changed out while overseas, drastically 
altering the capabilities of the ship.  But due to issues concerning the structural 
survivability of the ship, the ever-increasing cost of the program, reduced manning with 
increased demand, and the considerable difficulty to construct effective modules, the 
LCS program must be regarded as an experimental vessel that can be improved for the 
purposes for which it is intended.   
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Based on the research in this thesis, it is possible to make several 
recommendations for future policy as well as some suggestions regarding fruitful areas 
for additional research. 
A. RECOMMENDATIONS 
• Stop construction of the LCS at the 24 ships already paid for.  Operate 
these ships to develop the tactics and technologies needed to make the 
next generation of LCS a truly revolutionary ship. 
• Procure a multi-mission frigate and corvette in support the fleet in the HD 
role like the Israeli Eilat class and a modern patrol frigate like the PF 4921 
version of the Coast Guard’s Legend class.  Using the 55-ship LCS 
program as a model and the existing 10 LCS, roughly 10 PF 4921 patrol 
frigates and 30 Eilat corvettes could be purchased for the same price. 
• Extend the life of the existing MCM ships and begin the procurement of a 
new generation of MCM ships until the technology for the LCS MCM 
module is more developed. 
B. FURTHER RESEARCH 
This research leaves a number of questions unanswered concerning the need for a 
small combatant in the U.S. Navy.  
• What are the procurement and operating costs of the various types of 
corvettes and frigates described?   
• How best to integrate these small surface combatants into the existing 
fleet?  
• How effective is the current fleet structure in relation to the variety of 
missions, especially the HD missions? 
• Would a diesel submarine also be useful in support of the HD missions? 
Though the costs should be similar to the operating costs of the frigate and 
minesweepers currently in operation, the U.S. Navy does not normally operate large 
numbers of small ships.  Small combatants require additional support in terms of training 
and maintenance when not deployed.  The answer to this question will determine if these 
ships do represent a cost saving measure for the U.S. Navy over the LCS program.  Small 
combatants in the U.S. Navy traditionally only exist while their utility is needed during 
times of conflict.  Small ships are often the first ships cut during drawdown periods 
because of their more limited capabilities and their tendency to not fit well within the 
 75 
peacetime fleet architecture.  The fleet is built around the CSG and ARG structures, 
which have remained relatively unchanged in composition since the end of the Cold War.  
Both of these structures are well designed to conduct air and amphibious operations in 
support of sea control and power projection, but they are not optimal for operations in 
support of the HD mission. 
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